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Demystifying the Right to Exclude:
Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions
Shyamkrishna Balganesh
The right to exclude has for long been considered a central component of property. In
focusing on the element of exclusion, courts and scholars have paid little attention to
what it means for an owner to have a ‗right‘ to exclude and the forms in which this right
might manifest itself in actual property practice. For some time now, the right to exclude
has come to be understood as nothing but an entitlement to injunctive relief —that
whenever an owner successfully establishes title and an interference with the same, an
injunction will automatically follow. This view attributes to the right a distinctively
consequentialist meaning, calling into question the salience of property outside of its
enforcement context. Yet, in its recent decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, the
Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, declaring unequivocally that the right to
exclude did not mean a right to an injunction. This Article argues that eBay‘s negative
declaration serves to shed light on what the right has really meant all along —as the
correlative of a duty imposed on non-owners (i.e., the world at large) to keep away from
an ownable resource. This duty (of exclusion) in turn derives from the norm of
inviolability, a defining feature of social existence and accounts for the primacy of the
right to exclude in property discourses. This understanding is at once both nonconsequentialist and of deep functional relevance to the institution of property.

―The notion of property … consists in the right to exclude others from interference
with the more or less free doing with it as one wills.‖
— Justice Holmes in White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. (1908).
―The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured
strands in an owner‘s bundle of property rights.‖
— Justice Marshal in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (1982).
―[T]he creation of a right [to exclude] is distinct from the provision of remedies for
violations of that right.‖
— Justice Thomas in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC (2006).

INTRODUCTION
What does it mean to speak of property in terms of the ‗right to
exclude‘? As a direct consequence of equity‘s avowed preference for property
(over personal) rights in the grant of exclusionary relief, courts and scholars
have long come to identify property‘s right to exclude as meaning little more
than an entitlement to injunctive relief against a continuing (or repeated)
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interference with a resource. This view attributes to the right an entirely
consequentialist meaning, under which the right —and indeed all of
property— is normatively meaningless except when sought to be enforced in
a court of law. If property, as a fundamental social institution, is of
importance outside its remedial context, it becomes important to identify what
the ‗right to exclude‘ does mean other than the availability of an injunction.
This Article attempts to do this by locating its meaning in the norm of
inviolability and the obligation it casts on non-owners to stay away from
resources that are owned (and capable of being owned).
In his definition of property that has since become legendary,
Blackstone defined property as that ―sole and despotic dominion‖ exercised
over external things, ―in total exclusion‖ of the right of any other.1
Blackstone‘s definition has since been ably morphed into a more general
definition of property rights in the abstract, centered around the in rem right
to exclude.2 The Supreme Court too has on numerous occasions,
characterized the element of exclusion as a critical component of the ideal of
property, in dealing with the issue of takings.3
The idea of exclusion, in one form or the other, tends to inform almost
any understanding of property —be it private, public or community.4 The
only variation tends to be the person/group in whom it is vested. Private
property entails vesting it in an individual; public property, in a government
or other agency on behalf of a wider set of individuals; and community
property, in members of a community against non-members. Consequently,
the tendency among scholars, courts and legislators to equate conceptions of
property with the notion of exclusion remains all-pervasive.5
1

2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (emphasis supplied). For elaborations on
Blackstone‘s definition see Carol Rose, Canons of Property Talk, Or, Blackstone‘s Anxiety, 108
YALE L.J. 601 (1998); Robert P. Burns, Blackstone‘s Theory of the ―Absolute‖ Rights of Property,
54 U. CIN. L. REV. 67 (1985).
2
See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?,
111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001) (attributing the in rem conception of property to Blackstone).
3
See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 176, 179-80 (1979) (characterizing the right to
exclude as ―one of the most essential sticks‖ and as ―a universally held… fundamental element‖ of
property); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (referring
to it as ―one of the most treasured strands‖ of the property bundle). See also Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm‘n, 483 U.S. 825, 831
(1987).
4
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 63
(1985) (noting that the idea of ―exclusive possession‖ is implicit in the basic conception of
property). See also JAN LAITOS, LAW OF PROPERTY PROTECTION § 5.03[A] (1999).
5
Prominent scholarly examples include: J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (1997)
(defining property in terms of exclusion); J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 13 (1996)
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Within the exclusionary conception of property, the right-based
variant tends to dominate overwhelmingly. A little under a decade ago,
Thomas Merrill argued that the ―right to exclude‖ remains the sine qua non of
what property is.6 The Supreme Court too, whenever it invokes the idea,
speaks in terms of a ―right‖ to exclude.7 While scholarship and judicial dicta
over the years have attempted to understand and apply the exclusion-part of
the ‗right to exclude‘, the debate has tended to ignore altogether, the rightcomponent.8 Why is it unsurprisingly common to speak of property in terms
of a right to exclude? Does the identification of exclusion as a ‗right‘ shed
light on its practical significance (i.e., as a remedy), or is it merely a
rhetorical epithet emphasizing its centrality to the discourse (i.e., analogous to
the ‗right to life‘)?
Focusing on the right-component of the ‗right to exclude‘ is more than
just of theoretical value. It carries with it a deep functional relevance, one that
derives from the interplay between the language of rights and remedies.9 For
(characterizing property as an open-ended set of privileges bounded by an exclusionary
trespassory right); Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374
(1954); Richard A. Epstein, Weak and Strong Conceptions of Property: An Essay in Memory of
James Harris, in PROPERTIES OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JIM HARRIS 97 (Endicott et al. eds.,
2006); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1835 (2006); Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ.
L. REV. 371 (2003).
6
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998)
(characterizing the right to exclude as the sine qua non of property) (emphasis supplied).
7
See supra note 3; Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (using it in the
context of a regulatory taking); U.S. v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 282 (2002) (using it in the context of a
tax dispute); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 667 (1999) (using it in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment). See also Cleveland v. U.S.
531 U.S. 12, 24-25 (holding that the ―right to exclude‖ may exist in the context of a state‘s domain
of regulatory sovereignty). Interestingly, in his dissent in International News Service v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), Justice Brandeis characterized the right as the ―legal right to exclude
others‖ from enjoying the resource, id. at 250 (emphasis supplied). For an excellent overview of
the Court‘s emphasis on the right to exclude see David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, The Right
to Exclude Others From Private Property: A Fundamental Constitutional Right, 3 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL‘Y 39 (2000).
8
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules
in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965 (2004); Strahilevitz, supra note 5; Lior Strahilevitz,
Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437 (2006); Lee Ann Fennell,
Exclusion‘s Attraction: Land Use Controls in Tieboutian Perspective, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT
FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 163 (William Fischel, ed.
2006).
9
For an overview of some of the literature laying out the basic tenets of the debate over rights and
remedies see Neil MacCormick, Rights, Claims, and Remedies, 1 LAW & PHIL. 337 (1982); Peter
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quite some time now, the right to exclude in the context of both tangible and
intangible property has come to be associated with an entitlement to
exclusionary (i.e., injunctive) relief. Thus, interferences with an owner‘s
interests are thought of as entitling the owner to obtain a permanent
injunction restraining such interferences. The ‗right to exclude‘, in this
understanding then, is a remedial attribute, one related to the automatic
availability of injunctive relief for interferences with an owner‘s use and
enjoyment of his or her property.
In its recent decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC,10 the
Supreme Court however, effectively de-linked the ‗right to exclude‘ from any
entitlement to exclusionary relief. In eBay, the Court concluded that an
affirmative finding of validity and infringement did not automatically entitle a
patentee to an injunction against the infringer, and that the traditional fourfactor test used by courts of equity determined the availability of an
injunction.11 Translated into property terms, the Court basically concluded
that an interference with a property interest —continuing as it may be—
doesn‘t automatically entitle the owner to an injunction; the owner still has to
affirmatively establish the inadequacy of ordinary (i.e., compensatory)
remedies. The point was driven home most forcefully by Justice Kennedy,
who observed in his concurrence that the mere ―existence of a right to
exclude‖ in the owner, ―does not dictate the remedy for a violation of that
right‖.12
Almost all analyses of eBay have thus far focused on its impact on
patent law (or intellectual property, more generally), but have tended to
ignore the relevance of the Court‘s holding for property law in general.13
Birks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000). For extensions of this
debate into the realm of constitutional remedies see John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in
Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999); Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the
Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1 (2002); Mark R. Brown, Weathering Constitutional
Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1091.
10
126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
11
Id. at 1839.
12
Id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
13
See, e.g., Richard B. Klar, eBay, Inc. v. Mercexchance, L.L.C.: The Right to Exclude under
United States Patent Law and the Public Interest, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 985 (2006); Harold C.
Wegner, Injunctive Relief: A Charming Betsy Boomerang, NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROp. 156
(2006); Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and the Problem of Uniformity Cost, 14 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 421 (2007); Gavin D. George, Note, What is Hiding in the Bushes?
eBay‘s Effect on Holdout Behavior in Patent Thickets, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 557
(2007). But see Thomas L. Casagrande, The Reach of eBay, Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C.: Not
Just for Trolls and Patents, HOUSTON LAWYER, Vol. 44, Nov./Dec. 2006, at 10 (hinting at the

Demystifying the Right to Exclude

5

While the Court‘s holding was directed at patent injunctions in specific, the
express basis of its holding remained the need to subject patent injunctions to
the standard governing ―other cases‖ where injunctions were granted.14 In
concluding that this standard was the four-factor test, it implicitly
acknowledged its universal applicability to all grants of injunctive relief.
Viewed in this light, the eBay decision basically concluded that a grant of
injunctive relief (regardless of context) could never be automatic, or ensue as
a matter of right.
The eBay decision thus calls into question rather starkly, the meaning
and relevance of the ‗right to exclude‘ – both within the domain of
intellectual property and the wider subjects of real and personal property, in
so far as each of them remains premised on the idea of exclusion. If property
is no longer (automatically) associated with exclusionary relief, is it
meaningless to continue characterizing ‗the right to exclude‘ as its central
attribute? Taking the functional interpretation of the right to exclude as a
given, some have readily concluded that the eBay decision heralds the declassification of intellectual property (patents, specifically) as a species of
property strictu sensu, or that it dilutes the significance of the right to exclude
in understanding intellectual property, or indeed all property.15
My argument in this Article is very different. In this Article, I argue
that the eBay court‘s de-linking of right and remedy in relation to exclusion,
counter-intuitively, helps shed light on what the ‗right to exclude‘ does mean
in the context of intellectual property and property, more generally; and on
the role it plays in structuring different elements of the legal regime
governing them. The right to exclude, I argue, is best understood as a
normative device, deriving from the norm of resource-inviolability.
Analogous to the role of promising in contract law, the right to exclude
operates as an analytic tool, seeking to transplant the norm of inviolability
from morality to law, but admitting of exceptions as circumstances demand.
Part I attempts to set out different interpretations of the right to
exclude, using three different theoretical frameworks. Part II then argues that
possible applicability of the holding outside the realm of patent law, to all grants of injunctive
relief).
14
Id. at 1839.
15
See Yixin H. Tang, The Future of Patent Enforcement after eBay v. MercExchange, 20 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 235, 252 (2006) (―[A]fter the eBay ruling, one must question whether it is still
tenable to call patent rights ‗property rights‘.‖); Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement‘s
Embrace of Intellectual Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, U.C. Berkeley Public
Law Res. Paper No. 965083 (April 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=965083.
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if property is to be understood as an institution of significance independent of
its actual enforcement, the right to exclude needs to be understood as a
correlative right deriving from the norm of inviolability. It proceeds to show
that the right can indeed have independent normative traction regardless of
whether it is actually enforced, much like the performance right in contract
law. Understanding the right along these lines is at once both practical and
simultaneously able to explain its lingering persistence in property talk. Part
III then focuses on the interpretation that was at issue in the eBay case —the
exclusionary remedy variant. It examines the mechanical availability of
injunctions in the context of tangible and intellectual property and the
interface between equity courts‘ discretion and the status of the right. It then
focuses on the impact of eBay on this conception of the right and attempts to
show that the eBay decision may be seen as foreshadowing the move towards
a theory of ‗efficient infringement‘ or ‗efficient trespass‘.
The objective of this Article isn‘t to argue that the right to exclude is
all that there is in property.16 While the idea of property most certainly
consists of more than just exclusion, to be meaningful it must contain at
minimum some element of exclusion. How such exclusion might manifest
itself in property theory and practice then, forms the focus of the paper.
Accepting or rejecting the centrality of the ‗right to exclude‘ to property, are
both conditional upon a basic understanding of what the right means and
entails. This Article is an attempt to further that very understanding.
I. CONCEPTUALIZING THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE: A TAXONOMY
Comprehensive philosophical theories on the nature and function of
legal rights have been in existence for several centuries now.17 All the same,

16

Some have made just such a claim. See Merrill, supra note 6, at 754 (―[P]roperty means the
right to exclude others from valuable resources, no more and no less.‖). Others have argued
equally persuasively that the right to exclude is an ―essential but insufficient‖ component of what
property means. See Mossoff, supra note __. I bracket this question here and focus on
disaggregating the idea.
17
One of the earliest known expositions on the nature of rights in the English-speaking world was
that of Jeremy Bentham. See H.L.A. Hart, Bentham on Legal Rights, in OXFORD ESSAYS ON
JURISPRUDENCE: SECOND SERIES 171 (A.W.B. Simpson ed. 1973). For a history of the
development of rights see ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, RIGHTS FROM WRONGS: A SECULAR THEORY OF
THE ORIGIN OF RIGHTS (2004). See also CARL WELLMAN, THE PROLIFERATION OF RIGHTS: MORAL
PROGRESS OR EMPTY RHETORIC (1999).
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one finds little to no analysis of the right to exclude in their exegesis.18 In
almost identical vein, property scholars have tended to focus almost entirely
on the exclusion element, even though they continue to routinely deploy the
language of rights-theorists. Few have sought to pay close attention to both
elements, with the result that the precise meaning of the phrase —in spite of
its persistent usage— remains largely obscure.19 While some property
theorists speak of the right as a unitary concept, others use it as representing a
collective set of rights.20 Yet all of them consistently underplay their reasons
for characterizing the situation as giving rise to a right, when ironically, it is
precisely the study of these reasons that has remained the focus of rightstheorists. It is therefore rather surprising that proponents of the right to
exclude have tended to neglect altogether the unique interface of their ideas
with those of the rights discourse more generally.
What follows then in this Part is an attempt to describe this interface
by classifying possible conceptions of the right to exclude based on their
structural and functional attributes. On the face of it, a classificatory exercise
of this nature may seem irrelevant and largely academic. However, given that
the common law is structured as a set of events and responses to them,
differentiating one event (e.g., infraction of a specific right) from another
invariably dictates the law‘s response to it. Characterizing something as a
right —absolute or conditional— brings with it certain well-defined legal
consequences.21 Therefore, understanding the basis of such a characterization
helps shed light on the kind of consequences that do and ought to, follow.
A. Three Models of Analysis
This Section sets out three independent conceptual devices that courts
and scholars regularly employ in their analysis of rights (and connected
elements —e.g., duties, remedies, etc.).
1. The Right-Privilege Distinction

18

A notable exception to this remains an article written by Tony Honoré in 1960. See Anthony M.
Honoré, Rights of Exclusion and Immunities Against Divesting, 34 TULANE L. REV. 453 (1960)
(distinguishing between real and personal rights in the context of exclusion).
19
See Strahilevitz, supra note 5, at 1836 (―[F]or all its centrality in the minds of courts and legal
scholars, there is substantial conceptual confusion about the nature of the ‗right to exclude‘.‖).
20
See Merrill, supra note 6, at 13.
21
See R.B. Grantham & C.E.F. Rickett, Property Rights as a Legally Significant Event, 62 CAMB.
L.J. 717, 717 (2003) (―[O]nce in existence, [property rights] are themselves a species of event that
gives rise to legal rights and duties.‖).
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Perhaps the most important conceptual distinction in analyzing the
right to exclude is the right-privilege (also known as the right-liberty)
distinction. While positivist scholars employed the distinction early on,
Hohfeld is credited with laying out the distinction in its most lucid and
concrete terms. Writing at the turn of the twentieth century, Wesley Hohfeld
developed a comprehensive scheme for classifying legal concepts in the
common law (which he called jural relations).22 Relations were thus
classified into rights, duties, privileges, no-rights, powers, immunities,
liabilities and disabilities, using two independent matrices.23 In addition, legal
relations were identified as being in personam or paucital when they involved
discrete parties (i.e., a one-to-one connection such as a contractual one) or in
rem or multital, when they involved a relation between an individual and
multiple, indeterminate individuals.24 Property relations were characterized
by Hohfeld as being multital, since they involved the owner interacting with
an indeterminate set of individuals (potential trespassers).25
In this analysis, a right (or a claim) is defined as a situation that places
another individual (or group of individuals) under a correlative duty of some
sort.26 The content of the right is defined entirely by the content of the
obligation it imposes on another, i.e., the duty (its correlative). Hohfeld
contrasts his idea of a right with that of a privilege, which has independent
normative content, in that it privileges its holder to do certain things, quite
independent of others.27 Its correlative is thus a ―no-right‖ – a position that
represents the absence of a right in anyone else to stop the holder‘s privileged
action. Hohfeld makes the distinction most obvious with the illustration of X,
a landowner, and notes that ―X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the
former‘s land‖ the equivalent of which was that ―Y is under a duty toward X

22

He did this in two well-known articles: Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913); Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710
(1917). The two were combined in book form after his untimely death. WESLEY NEWCOMB
HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (Walter
Wheeler Cook ed., 2000) (1919).
23
See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental, supra note __ (laying out the matrices in some detail). For an
application of the several concepts to tort law see Albert J. Harno, Tort-Relations, 30 YALE L.J.
145 (1920).
24
HOHFELD, supra note __, 68-74.
25
See Pavlos Eleftheriadis, The Analysis of Property Rights, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 31 (1996)
(elaborating on Hohfeld‘s application of his concepts to property).
26
HOHFELD, supra note __, at 36-38.
27
Id. at 38.
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to stay off the place‖.28 He further observes in the context of the rightprivilege distinction that ―whereas X has a right or claim that Y, the other
man, should stay off the land, he himself has the privilege of entering on the
land.29‖ Later, specifically in the context of property, Hohfeld makes the
distinction even more clear, with the example of a hypothetical landowner.30
Whereas a right is only ever brought into question upon a breach of its
correlative duty, a privilege offers its holder the opportunity to perform a
positive act unfettered by another‘s claims or actions.31 The right-privilege
distinction is then, little more than a positive/negative distinction. Yet the
distinction is more than just of philosophical relevance. Whereas it is clear
when the law protects a right —when it imposes a duty on another, it isn‘t
readily apparent, when the law protects a privilege. If a privilege is
understood as the absence of rights in others (to restrict the privileged action),
this negative definition does little to clarify the circumstances under which an
action may be considered privileged. Consequently, scholars have been quick
to point out that the privilege isn‘t strictly legal in the same sense as rights
(and duties) are, and therefore sits rather uneasily in Hohfeld‘s framework,
given that it remains devoid of content, absent specific circumstances.32
28

Id.
Id. at 39.
30
Id. at 96. He observes:
First, A has multital legal rights, or claims, that others, respectively, shall not enter on
the land, that they shall not cause physical harm to the land, etc., such others being under
respective correlative legal duties. Second, A has an indefinite number of legal privileges
of entering on the land, using the land, harming the land, etc… he has privileges of doing
on or to the land what he pleases.
31
For more recent attempts to use the distinction in the context of property and tort law see Lee
Ann Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400 (2007). See also Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Property Along the Tort Spectrum: Trespass to Chattels and the Anglo-American
Doctrinal Divergence, 35 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 135 (2006).
32
See Alan R. White, Privilege, 41 MOD. L. REV. 299, 299 (1978) (―What makes anything a
privilege is a particular characteristic of the circumstances in which it occurs.‖). Hohfeld‘s
analysis is usually associated with the ‗bundle of rights‘ conception of property —that property
consists of little more than a bundle of rights, privileges and powers. The aforementioned lack of
specific content in relation to the privileges that form part of the bundle led some to characterize
the bundle view as a meaningless rhetorical concept. See James E. Penner, The ―Bundle of Rights‖
Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996).
In recognition of this criticism, and in order to give the idea more normative traction,
some preferred the term ‗liberty‘ —rendering the idea circumstance-neutral. See see Glanville
Williams, The Concept of Legal Liberty, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1129 (1956). But see Albert
Kocourek, The Hohfeld System of Fundamental Legal Concepts, 15 ILL. L. REV. 24, 27-37 (1920)
(arguing that Hohfeld‘s construction conflated privileges, liberties and powers). Interestingly, it
was Bentham who used the term ‗liberty‘ to denote precisely the same thing well before Hohfeld
29
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While a right and a privilege in this understanding then no doubt
remain distinct, it is important to note that in a vast majority of situations, a
privilege comes to be protected by a right. In other words, a privilege
becomes capable of being exercised because of the existence of an
overarching right that shadows it and requires others to abstain from
interfering with the privileged area of action.33 This is often referred to as the
‗shielding thesis‘. It helps explain why rights and privileges are often
conflated and why in a vast majority of situations privileges continue to
derive protection (from the law) indirectly, even if not directly. Privileges
thus represent situations where the law protects behavior, by its active noninterference (or acquiescence) —it both doesn‘t interfere on its own and
additionally denies others a right to interfere. It must be further remembered
that even though rights are usually accompanied by privileges, situations do
exist where privileges remain unprotected by rights34 —and it is here that the
distinction begins to assume practical significance.
2. The Two-Tiered Structure of Rights (and Duties)
The second analytic device of relevance for our purpose is the twotiered nature of rights, referred to as the distinction between primary and
secondary rights (and duties). Alternatively characterized as the
substantive/procedural or right/remedy distinction, at base the idea postulates
the existence of a primary right (or duty) that is brought into existence either
volitionally (e.g., contractually) or through the operation of law (e.g. tort
law). Upon an infraction of the right (or the duty), the law then provides for a
second right (and/or duty) to operationalize the primary one or remedy its
breach.35 Contract law is taken as paradigmatic of this structure, where the
did. See Hart, supra note __, at 174. Bentham characterized liberties as ―right[s] resulting from the
absence of obligation‖, to denote their specifically negative structure. Id; JEREMY BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 302 (Bowring ed., 1970) (1789).
Many also objected that Hohfeld‘s usages contracted established linguistic conventions. See Max
Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1141, 1149 (1938)
33
See MATTHEW H. KRAMER ET AL., A DEBATE OVER RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRIES 12-13
(1998); H.L.A. Hart, Legal Rights, in ESSAYS ON LEGAL RIGHTS 162, 171 (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1982);
John Finnis, Some Professorial Fallacies About Rights, 4 ADELAIDE L. REV. 377, 378-79 (1972).
34
See Arthur L. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163, 167-68 (1919).
35
For a lucid elaboration of the concept see Peter Birks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 20
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (2000). For similar views in early American scholarship see C.C.
Langdell, Classification of Rights and Wrongs, 13 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1900); James Barr Ames,
Disseisin of Chattels, 3 HARV. L. REV. 25, 34, 337 (1890). Hohfeld too spent some time
elaborating on the primary-secondary distinction. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD,
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contract gives rise to a set of rights and duties between the contracting
parties.36 Upon a breach of the contract‘s terms, the law then provides the
non-breaching party with the option of bringing an action for the breach
(coupled with remedies for the same). Scholars have tended to disagree on
their characterization of the secondary right —some call it a right like any
other, others a remedy, and yet others a remedial right.37 Yet, all of them refer
to the idea that an interference with a primary relationship gives rise to a
secondary one.
While contract law remains the paradigm of the tiered structure,
problems begin to emerge when one enters the domain of tort law, for here
liability is premised on a primary duty (of care) the existence of which the
law determines ex post, upon an alleged interference with it.38 The primary
relationship is thus determined at the stage of the secondary one. This
artificial construction has resulted in some debate over whether tort law does
embody the two-tiered structure,39 with the general view tending to be that it
indeed does, even if the determination in many cases happens subsequent to
the conduct because in a majority of situations (e.g., driving a car), the basic
contours of the duty remain known ex ante —e.g., not to drive carelessly.
The exact origins of the tiered structure remain somewhat unclear.
While both Blackstone and Austin employed the primary-secondary
framework routinely,40 some trace it to the French philosopher Robert

FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 102 (W.W. Cook, ed.
1919) (disagreeing with the views of Ames).
36
Lord Diplock, who is credited with introducing the concept to doctrinal analysis by courts, first
applied it in the context of contract law. See Brice Dickson, The Contribution of Lord Diplock to
the General Law of Contract, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 441, 448-49 (1989).
37
See Birks, supra note __, at 9 (observing that the term ‗remedy‘ remains obscure); Kit Barker,
Rescuing Remedialism in Unjust Enrichment Law: Why Remedies are Right, 57 CAMB. L.J. 301,
319 (1998) (advocating the use of ‗rights‘ to describe remedies).
38
See Peter Birks, The Concept of a Civil Wrong, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW
31 (D. Owen ed. 1995). See also Peter Birks, Equity in Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy,
26 WEST. AUST. L. REV. 1 (1996).
39
See id; Nicholas J. McBride, Duties of Care— Do They Really Exist?, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 417 (2004).
40
See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 117; JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES IN JURISPRUDENCE 787 (R.
Campbell ed., 1869).
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Pothier, who employed it in the context of his exposition of contract law.41
Hohfeld too emphasized the distinction in his classification.42
A primary right thus represents a situation where an individual is
vested with a right, independent of any preceding relationship.43 A secondary
right on the other hand is always contingent on the existence of a primary
relationship involving the party claiming the secondary right, and is therefore
conditional.44
3. The Entitlement Framework
In 1972 Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed propounded an
entirely independent theory of entitlements —a unified theory of property and
tort—one that would focus entirely on mechanisms of protection.45 Whereas
Hohfeld had sought to lay out individual jural relations as they existed prior
to any court pronouncement, Calabresi and Melamed focused on rules
adopted by courts in giving effect to (or to use their language ―protect[ing]‖)
the entitlement, i.e., the jural relation.46
Their model involved two steps. In the first, the legal system vests the
entitlement in someone and in the second, it adopts one of three rules to
protect the entitlement so vested.47 Calabresi and Melamed focus almost
entirely on the second of these steps (―second order decisions‖) —and
classified forms of protection as property rules (when the law protects against
involuntary transfers), liability rules (when the law allows involuntary
transfers) and inalienability (when the law disallows all transfers).48 Calabresi
and Melamed then argue that a host of considerations –—economic
efficiency, distributional goals and morality guide judges‘ (and lawmakers‘)
41

Bernard Rudden, Correspondence, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 288 (1990). For more on
Pothier‘s contribution see Joseph M. Perillo, Robert J. Pothier‘s Influence on the Common Law of
Contract, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 267 (2004).
42
HOHFELD, supra note __, at 108-09. Indeed, Hohfeld seems to hint at the possibility of a tertiary
right as well, in situations where the breach of a primary right gives rise to a secondary right (of
enforcement), which in turn results in a court decision that gives a party a third right against the
party in breach. See id.
43
See Corbin, supra note __, at 171-72.
44
See id. at 172; Arthur L. Corbin, Rights and Duties, 33 YALE L.J. 501, 511 (1924).
45
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
46
Id. at 1092.
47
Id.
48
Id. 1092-93.
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choice of rule.49 Almost all the literature on the Calabresi-Melamed model
that has followed, has come to view the model as focusing almost entirely on
the issue of remedies— legal, equitable or otherwise.50 In this understanding
then, a property rule is commonly associated with ex ante injunctive relief,
while liability protection, with an award of damages ex post.
The Hohfeldian model and the entitlement framework exhibit an
interesting reflexive symmetry.51 Hohfeld focused entirely on the bare
structure of conceptions (or entitlements), disregarding their actual
enforcement or vindication. Calabresi and Melamed on the other hand
focused entirely on remedies, disregarding the structure and content of
individual entitlements.52 While Hohfeld cautioned against the use of
remedies to understand a jural relation, Calabresi and Melamed used remedies
exclusively in order to understand the functional relevance of an
entitlement.53
In its focus on the actual mechanisms of protection (i.e., enforcement),
the entitlement framework neglects situations where jural relations (or
entitlements) come to be protected not necessarily by operation of law, but
rather with its acquiescence and approval. The distinction between a right and
a privilege represents just such a situation. The effective exercise of a
privilege, unlike a right, requires absolutely no recourse to enforcement
mechanisms. Privileges of this sort find no place in the entitlement
framework, for they do not invoke any legal mechanism and therefore aren‘t
protected as such.54
49

Id. 1093-1105.
See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1720 (2004). See
also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and
Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (1995); Richard R.W.
Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules and Liability Rules: Broken
Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 267 (2003).
51
In the past, scholars have attempted to analyze the interaction between the Calabresi-Melamed
and Hohfedlian models. Most of these have however involved unpacking the former‘s entitlement
structure using Hohfeld‘s ideas, rather than analyzing how the two actually might compliment
each other. See STEPHEN MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 27 (1990); Fennell, supra note 29, at
1406; Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822 (1993).
52
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 45, at 1090 (―[T]he fundamental thing that the law does is
to decide which of [two] conflicting parties will be entitled to prevail.‖).
53
Ironically, Calabresi and Melamed didn‘t even so much as reference Hohfeld‘s work, even
though they note that their project is aimed at integrating ―legal relationships‖, a phrase that had
formed the focus of Hohfeld‘s seminal study. See id. at 1089.
54
For an elaboration of this problem in the context of the owner‘s remedy of self-help (a useprivilege), see Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of Property, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL‘Y 69
50
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The entitlement framework had the effect of moving the discussion of
rights away from its conceptualist traditions. Whereas the discussion of rights
and duties had hitherto focused on issues such as the manner in which it
vested and the parties between whom it operated, the entitlement framework
now required analyses to focus on rights and duties primarily through the
consequences of their breach. It thus focused on understanding the right
through the lens of the remedy. Thus for example, it mattered little whether
an entitlement had the structural attributes characteristically associated with
ownership, for it to be categorized as a property right.55 What was needed was
that the law protect the entitlement with a ‗property rule‘ upon an infraction.
The right in this understanding then is meaningful only when protected by a
specific kind of remedy. The entitlement framework thus moved the emphasis
in rights-analysis towards remedies.56
This near-exclusive focus on remedialism attributed to the law a
principally corrective (or restorative) function. Legal rules became relevant
only when they attached consequences to individuals‘ actions —i.e., as forms
of enforcement, but never as independent sources of values and principles
that could guide their behavior ex ante.57 The enforcement framework thus
assumes that the law comes into play only during acts of recalcitrance (e.g.,
breach of contract or violations of the duty of care), but never influences
behavior independent of its enforcement-function.58 It thus ignores the fact
that legal rules do elicit compliance and cooperation most often out of a belief
in the legitimacy and fairness of legal authority and not merely in

(2005) (attributing some of these problems to the over-extensive use of symmetry in economic
understandings of property).
55
See Merrill & Smith, supra note __, at 379-83 (noting how the Calabresi-Melamed framework
contributed to the demise of the traditional understanding of property as an in rem right). For more
on this move in the economic analysis towards remedialism see Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus,
Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J.1335, 1139 (1986).
56
See Emily Sherwin, Introduction: Property Rules as Remedies, 106 YALE L.J. 2083 (1997)
(emphasizing how the entitlement framework has shifted legal analysis in the direction of
remedies).
57
For a comprehensive critique of the entitlement framework‘s emphasis on enforcement and its
neglect of this ―guidance‖ function see Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A
Better View of the Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REV. 837 (1997). See generally Meir Dan-Cohen,
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV.
625 (1984) (using the same distinction in the context of rules consciously directed at individuals
and those directed at officials, in the context of criminal law).
58
Id. at 858.
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contemplation of remedial consequences (i.e., sanctions).59 Legal rules are
meaningful well before their breach is even in contemplation.
B. Possible Formulations of the Right to Exclude
Applying these three analytic devices to the ‗right to exclude‘
provides us with four possible conceptions of the right. The first two remain
distinctly non-remedial and involve the claim-right and the privilege/liberty.
The remaining two adopt a remedial approach to the right, building on the
entitlement framework. The four versions together are: (i) the claim-right to
exclude; (ii) the privilege-right to exclude; (iii) the right to vindicate one‘s
ownership through enforcement; and (iv) the right to an exclusionary remedy.
Each is described in more detail below.
Table 1: A Conceptual Taxonomy of the Right to Exclude
Attribute
Content

Example

Potential Drawback

Defined by the
correlative duty (of
non-interference)
imposed on others
Defined by the
exercise of useprivileges to achieve
exclusion from
resource
Defined by the remedy

Patent Law‘s
―right to exclude‖
35 U.S.C. §
154(a)(1)

Content dependent
on independent
normative source

Defined by entitlement to
commence action

Availability of
action for trespass

Defined by equitable
injunctive relief
(automatic or otherwise)

Automatic
Injunction Rule

Conception
Claim Right

Privilege-Right

Remedial
Right
Ownership
Vindication
Exclusionary
Remedy

59

Self-help
remedies

Impracticality of
self-help – e.g.,
intangibles
Judicial Discretion
Contingent on vagaries
of common law action
Subject to the rules of
equitable discretion;
i.e., a four-factor test

Indeed this ideal formed the driving force behind much of legal positivism. Hart famously
characterized this idea as the ―reflective critical attitude‖ of individuals in society. See H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 88 (1961). See also infra Section III.B.2, for an elaboration of this
idea.
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1. The Claim Right to Exclude
One of the characteristic features of claim rights, as noted earlier, is
that these rights are always correlative. Consequently, they can never be
understood independent of the jural relationship they form a part of, and the
correlative duty that they impose on others. Corbin provides an apt definition
of a claim right, and notes that it ―is a relation existing between two persons
when society commands that the second of these shall conduct himself in a
certain way (to act or to forbear) for the benefit of the first.‖ 60 The claim right
then is to be understood entirely from the nature of the correlative duty that it
imposes on others.61 While the term ‗correlative‘ carries with it the
connotation of a bond of sorts between the two elements, in reality it signifies
little more than the perspective from which the relationship is viewed. Thus
some have favored replacing correlativity with the word ‗converse‘ to signify
this emphasis.62
Leaving aside the precise meaning (or appropriateness) of the term
correlative, what remains obvious about the claim right is that its normative
content is determined by the nature and structure of the duty imposed on
another.63 Understanding a right thus entails identifying its correlative duty
and determining the origins of the said duty. A duty may originate voluntarily
(e.g., contract), or merely out of volitional behavior (e.g., tort). In addition,
the source of the duty may lie in morality or social practice. 64 When this

60

Arthur L. Corbin, Rights and Duties, 33 YALE L.J. 501, 502 (1924).
When the right imposes a duty on a determinate (or identifiable) individual or class of
individuals it is a right in personam, when the group is indeterminate or open-ended, the right is in
rem. It is critical however to note that the distinction isn‘t merely one of numbers (i.e., single and
multiple), but rather of determinacy. See Radin, supra note __, at 1153-56.
62
See Max Radin, Correlativity, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 904-05 (1929). For further criticism (and
defenses) of the concept of correlation see David Lyons, The Correlativity of Rights and Duties, 4
NÔUS 45 (1970); Jack Donnelly, How Are Rights and Duties Correlative?, 16 J. VALUE INQUIRY
287 (1982); Marcus G. Singer, The Basis of Rights and Duties, 23 PHIL. STUD. 48 (1972).
63
Yet this correlative normativity is unidirectional —for, it remains possible to have a duty
without a correlative right (e.g., the tortious duty of care), whereas a claim right cannot exist
absent its correlative duty. See WILLIAM MARKBY, ELEMENTS OF LAW 85 (1905).
64
Interestingly Hohfeld restricted his analysis to strictly legal relations, seemingly denying the
existence (or influence) of morality. See HOHFELD, supra note __, at 27. For an attempt to draw
out similarities between moral rights and the idea of legal rights, as Hohfeld used them see Bruno
R. Rea, The Interplay of Legal and Moral Rights, 20 J. VALUE INQUIRY 235 (1986). Hohfeld‘s
structure remains readily applicable to moral relationships as well. See KRAMER ET AL., supra note
__, at 8 (―[V]irtually every aspect of Hohfeld‘s analytical scheme applies as well, mutatis
mutandis, to the structuring of moral relationships.‖). See also Corbin, supra note __, at 505-06.
61
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happens, the correlative right remains a moral right unless a legal rule
internalizes it, whereupon it gets transformed into a legal right.65
The claim right to exclude is understood then through the correlative
duty it imposes on others (in rem)— to ‗exclude themselves‘ from an
identifiable resource. When individuals view themselves as being placed
under a duty (or obligation) to keep off of a resource, its owner is said to be
vested with the claim right to exclude. The source of this duty may be a legal
directive (e.g., patent law) or completely independent of the law. The content
of the duty (to exclude oneself) thus imparts meaning to the claim right
conception.
On the face of it, the claim right to exclude may appear to be of little
more than analytic value, for if it is to be understood entirely through its
correlative duty, its independent value seems minimal. Consequently
discussions of the right to exclude tend to ignore this conception altogether.
Yet, its value lies principally in its correlativity, as we will see, which
contributes to the functioning of property (and with it ownership) as a
coordination device.
2. The Privilege-Right to Exclude
Unlike claim rights, which are understood entirely through their
correlatives, privileges (or privilege-rights) represent specific activities,
which when undertaken by their holder, remain beyond reproach or the reach
of sanctions. Ordinarily, privileges tend to accompany claim-rights (and
operate in their protective shadow) thereby often obscuring the important
difference between them.
Understood in this vein, the privilege-right to exclude in the context of
property entails the law affording the owner (or holder at times) of a resource
the option of using the resource in such a way as to exclude others from it.66
The exact nature of such exclusionary use tends to vary from one resource
and circumstance to another. Thus, for chattels it may be no more than
65

See Joel Feinberg, The Social Importance of Moral Rights, 6 ETHICS 175 (1992).
Indeed numerous exclusionary strategies involve the use of ‗exclusionary privileges‘, where
owners use a resource and its myriad attributes to exclude others from it. ‗Exclusionary amenities‘
then represent no more than such privileges. For a comprehensive overview of the use of
exclusionary amenities as a strategy of exclusion see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary
Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437 (2006). On occasions, use-strategies
that involve exclusion are referred to as ‗rights of exclusion‘, when terminologically they really
represent exclusionary privileges. See Strahilevitz, supra note __, at 1859-61, 1861 n.96 (noting
that ―exclusionary vibes‖ and ―exclusionary amenities‖ do in reality represent privileges).
66
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exercising complete physical control over the entity, while for realty it may
involve the erection of a fence or other boundary.67
The rules of self-help most aptly represent the idea of exclusionary
privileges.68 Even though self-help exists in the context of both movable and
immovable property, it remains significantly more common in the context of
the former. While the law tends to remain indifferent to exclusionary
privileges in general (given that they derive their force de facto and not de
jure), in the context of movables (i.e., chattels) it exhibits a preference for
them. The common law of trespass to chattels consciously disfavors granting
chattel owners a legal remedy for physical trespasses to the chattel in the
belief that the privilege-based remedy of self-help remains sufficient, unless
the owner is actually dispossessed or the chattel itself tangibly harmed.69
Here, the privilege right conception of exclusion thus remains central.70
Exclusionary privileges aren‘t without their drawbacks. First, they
depend directly on the owner‘s ability to exercise them, to be of any utility.
Thus, in the context of land, the effectiveness of an exclusionary privilege
depends on the owner being able —financially, or otherwise— to build a
fence around his land. Once, built too, the owner must be able and willing to
monitor infractions and enforce trespasses. So it is with chattels as well.
Second, since the exercise of the privilege is dependent on the nature of the
resource, there are resources where self-help is ineffective. This is most
common in the context of informational and virtual resources (that are by

67

For more on the role of fences, boundaries and the use of self-help see generally Robert C.
Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 623 (1986).
68
Self-help is as old as the idea of property itself. See generally Mathew R. Christ, Legal SelfHelp on Private Property in Classical Athens, 119 AM. J. PHILOLOGY 521 (1998); Joshua Getzler,
Property, Personality, and Violence, in PROPERTIES OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JIM HARRIS
246 (Endicott et al. eds., 2006).
69
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 86 (5th ed. 1984);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (1965); Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 73, 78 (2003).
70
As the Restatement notes: ―Sufficient legal protection of the possessor's interest in the mere
inviolability of his chattel is afforded by his privilege to use reasonable force to protect his
possession against even harmless interference.‖ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. e
(1965) (emphasis supplied).
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their nature non-excludable).71 Consequently, the law protects exclusionary
privileges here through an additional duty that it imposes on non-owners.72
3. Remedial Rights to Exclude
While the claim- and privilege- rights to exclude represent primary
right conceptions of the right, the remedial variants derive from a secondary
right conception. They thus remain premised on the existence of antecedent
rights that they seek to operate in furtherance of: ubi jus, ibi remedium.73
Within the remedial conception of the right, two further strands can be
identified —one that focuses directly on vindicating a prior right and another
that focuses on enforcing it.
(i)

The Vindicatory Right

The first remedial variant takes as a given the idea that exclusion
(generally, as a claim right) remains an essential attribute of ownership and
moves on to providing the owner of a resource with the option of reaffirming
such exclusion by declaring him to be the owner of the resource. It thus
derives its normative (or exclusionary) content, entirely from the logically
prior primary relationship that it attempts to vindicate.
What remains crucial is that this right doesn‘t seek to bring about
exclusion directly (i.e., enforce it) but merely reaffirm its existence as a
necessary attribute of ownership. It tracks very closely the Roman law idea of
the in rei vindicatio, which provided an owner with the ability to have his
dominium over a resource declared by a court of law.74 While several civil
law jurisdictions continue to provide for a vindicatio-type remedy, the

71

For an overview of self-help in the intangible world see Kenneth Dam, Self-Help in the Digital
Jungle, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1999); Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self-Help, 1
J.L. ECON. & POL‘Y 215 (2005); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998).
72
In the nature of anticircumvention or digital rights management (DRM) measures.
73
Where there is a right, there must be a remedy. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra __, at 23.
74
For an elaboration on the Roman understanding of ownership and the role of the vindicatio
therein see Peter Birks, The Roman Law of Dominium and the Idea of Absolute Ownership, [1985]
ACTA JURIDICA 1. For more on the in rei vindicatio see ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN
THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC 91 (1968); B. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 125
(1962); W.W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 675 (3rd
ed., 1963).
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common law instead uses the action of trespass to the same end, albeit in a
less effective way.75
The right thus consists in an owner‘s ability to commence an action
where his ownership/title is adjudicated upon, even if only in a relative
sense.76 It is worth re-emphasizing that the right has no connection with the
nature of the remedy that the action eventually results in. Thus, if the
trespassory action were to result in an award of damages, it would still have
resulted in exclusion, in so far as the favorable result (to the owner)
vindicates his pre-existent right to exclude, even if it doesn‘t directly enforce
it. The tendency to equate the right to exclude with a trespassory conception
of the right often ignores this secondary nature of the right.77
(ii)

The Right to Exclusionary Relief

Of the different formulations of the right to exclude, the one that
associates it with an entitlement to an exclusionary remedy —i.e., an
injunction— remains the most pragmatic, and is the most popular. In this
understanding, the right to exclude consists of an owner‘s option not just to
bring an action for trespasses, but also to obtain from a court, the equitable
remedy of an injunction, restraining another (i.e., placing them under an
additional duty) from interfering with the owner‘s resource. The right is thus
converted into an enforceable claim. Much like the vindicatory option, it too
is predicated on the existence of an antecedent primary right.
Given however that injunctive relief is an equitable remedy and
consequently is granted at the discretion of a court, the extent to which a
property owner can be said to have a right to it remains questionable.78 Yet on
numerous occasions courts have been ready to place fetters on their
discretion, identifying specific circumstances under which relief will
necessarily follow and situations where it won‘t. Over time thus the strong
discretionary element in injunctive relief has come to be transformed into a
weak one as a consequence of which it became common to speak of a ‗right

75

UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
INTRODUCTION 182-87 (2000); DAVID IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS 107-08 (1999).
76
See David Fox, Relativity of Title at Law and Equity, 65 CAMB. L.J. 330, 334 (2006).
77
This is seen most clearly in the work of Jim Harris, who characterized all of property as
consisting of inter alia a ―bounded trespassory right‖. See HARRIS, supra note __, at 14.
78
See Neil MacCormick, Discretion and Rights, 8 LAW & PHIL. 23 (1989). For more on this see
infra Section III.B
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to injunctive relief‘ in specific situations.79 Indeed, the automatic injunction
rule that was in issue in eBay represented precisely one such situation.
Even if the entitlement may be characterized as a right, the fact that its
recognition is dependent entirely on a court‘s interpretation of the
circumstances remains a major drawback.80
C. Unitary, Bundled, or Disaggregative?
Which of the four conceptions do we mean then, when we speak of
the ‗right to exclude‘ being a central part of property? One might argue that
any of the identified formulations should suffice to constitute the right to
exclude, in the context of property. In other words, if an individual were to be
vested with any of the options identified above, he can be deemed to have a
property right, in relation to the resource over which it operates. Yet, if any
conception would be sufficiently constitutive of the right, it would imply that
the right assumes different meanings in different contexts, in the process
attributing to property a contextual fluidity that undermines its integrity as an
institution of independent moral significance.81 Consequently, if we are to
continue characterizing the right to exclude as an integral part of what
property is (on the assumption of course, that property is something definite),
it demands a level of consistency in our understanding of the right.
Of the two primary variants of the right, the privilege formulation is
perhaps the weakest to justify as an independent (free-standing) conception of
the right. Imagine a situation where a privilege (to exclude) alone exists,
79

See Birks, supra note __, at 16-17. As Birks notes:
Orders for specific performance or for injunctions…are weakly discretionary. To speak
of a right to specific performance or injunction…is not nonsense. We know on what
facts a person is entitled to such an order.
For the distinction between weak and strong conceptions of discretion see RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 30-33 (1977); George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE
L.J. 474.
80
For more on courts‘ willingness to alter the standard of grant, depending on subjective
circumstances see DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1991)
(analyzing the conspicuous inconsistency in courts‘ grants of injunctive relief in spite of the
circumstances remaining identical).
81
This would in the process lend itself to a form of property skepticism —the belief that the term
and institution of property are meaningless constructs whose content and significance tend to vary
across time, place and resource, admitting of no unifying features. See Thomas C. Grey, The
Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1980); Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50 CAMB. L.J. 252 (1991). My argument
no doubt derives from the belief that property is indeed a meaningful concept with a few
identifiable unifying features, the primary one of which remains the right to exclude.
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without a claim-right. In this situation, the only thing holding the entire
system of property in place would be the owners‘ (or holders‘) ability to
exclude others from the resource. With there being no a priori duty on others
to keep-off, the law of self-help would become the default rule of law,
favoring the strong and powerful to the detriment of everyone else. A
potentially anarchical situation, it remains untenable as an ordered system of
property. Even if the privilege were to accompany the remedial (but not
claim-right) conceptions, it would present the same problems. Since the
remedial alternatives remain premised on the primary one, courts would be
restricted to reaffirming or enforcing the privilege alone, in turn delegating
much of its application to the holder‘s abilities. The shielding thesis then —
whereby a privilege is always shielded by a claim-right82— is not just an
interesting coincidence, but rather a critical default for the very existence of a
privilege.
In similar vein, the vindicatory conception of the right depends almost
entirely on the primary claim-right conception for its normative content and is
therefore of little significance independently. Unless the right to be vindicated
does indeed independently convey something, the vindication itself remains
meaningless.
This leaves us then with the claim-right and exclusionary remedy
variants of the right. In what follows, I argue that understanding the right to
exclude as a correlative, claim right allows for an appreciation of property,
outside of its remedial context. Property, remains an institution of deep social
significance and the remedial variant (i.e., the exclusionary remedy
conception) tends to gloss over this reality in its emphasis on functionalism.83
The correlative right variant —contrary to popular belief— remains just as
functional and perhaps, more pragmatic. Ironically, the correlative right
conception also best explains the holding in eBay and its repudiation of the
automatic injunction rule.
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See supra note __ and accompanying text.
In spite of it being a remedial (and therefore dependent) variant, the exclusionary remedy
conception of the right to exclude continues to dominate property debates among both scholars
and courts See David Frisch, Remedies as Property: A Different Perspective on Specific
Performance Clauses, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1691, 1713 (1994) (―[I]f an entitlement, under
appropriate circumstances, cannot be protected by [a property] rule, the entitlement (whatever else
it may be) is not a property interest.‖). Indeed this remains the case in other common law countries
as well. See William Gummow, The Injunction in Aid of Legal Rights— An Australian
Perspective, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 103-04 (1993) (noting how in Australia injunctions
are granted only to protect property rights, but that the definition of property rights is often
premised on the availability of an injunction, making the logic circular).
83

Demystifying the Right to Exclude

23

II. THE CORRELATIVE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE: GROUNDING PROPERTY IN SOCIAL
MORALITY
The institution of property remains socially and morally significant
outside of its remedial context. Individuals continue to respect the ideal of
ownership by default, even when the enforcement of such ownership is
known to be problematic. Exceptions certainly do exist, but the institution of
ownership remains deeply entrenched in almost all societies. Surely then, the
‗right to exclude‘, if indeed of centrality to the institution of property, must
have some relevance outside of the enforcement context, This Part argues that
the right is best understood as a correlative claim right, consisting exclusively
of the duty it imposes on others to exclude themselves from resources that
they don‘t have a legitimate claim over. The duty in turn, derives from the
moral norm of inviolability around which the institution of property is
structured.
While this moral foundation informs the general structure of property
(and the right to exclude), the disjoint between law and morality on the issue
of enforcement tracks in almost identical manner, the right/enforcement
interface that exists in contract law between contracting and promising, two
interrelated, yet independent social practices. Much can therefore be learnt by
examining the role of the primary/claim right within contract law and its role,
bereft of remedial vindication. To be sure, contract and property law do
remain distinct in several important ways; yet, the argument isn‘t that what
remains true for contract will necessarily carry over to property, but rather
that the structural interplay between law and morality within the former sheds
light on a possible equivalent within the context of exclusion in property.
A. The Right to Exclude as a Moral Norm
Exclusion and its right-based manifestation, i.e., the right to exclude,
perform a function in our understanding of property almost identical to the
one played by that of promising and the duty of performance in the area of
contract law. The right to exclude gives property is structural basis, a
structure that derives from the social and moral basis of the institution —and
remains tied intrinsically to the notion of inviolability; in the exact same way
that promising and the obligation (or right) to perform one‘s promise form the
foundation for contracting. We ought to begin then with an understanding of
what the notion of inviolability is, and how it operates in law and socialmorality.

Demystifying the Right to Exclude

24

1. The Principle of ‗Inviolability‘
The right to exclude becomes a perfectly logical idea if it is
understood entirely in its primary or correlative right conception —and thus
through the lens of the duty it imposes on others. The duty in turn derives its
normative content from the moral notion of inviolability embodied in the
institution of ownership.
Attempts to derive a moral explanation for the institution of private
property abound in the literature, and the attempt here certainly isn‘t to add to
this debate.84 Most often these moral constructions remain tied to attempts to
develop an explanatory theory for the institution, so as to justify its continued
existence as an institution of independent significance. In referring to the
norms of morality surrounding the institution of property, the emphasis here
is merely on establishing that the idea of the right to exclude can be
understood independent of enforcement structures that give it operative
content, since property as an institution has extra-legal (or social) elements
that influence it and on which it is structured. Going back then to the basic
structure of the correlative right, we noted that the correlative right was
defined by its placing others (in rem or the world at large) under a duty to
exclude themselves from the object over which the right was to operate. The
right is thus defined entirely by its imposition of correlative duties on
others.85 What then are the origins of such a right and duty? Why do we have
reason to presume the existence of such a duty, so as to vest a correlative
right to it in someone?
Scholars have long noted that the principle of inviolability remains
one of the most basic elements of social existence.86 Inviolability refers to the
idea that certain entities (things and persons) are considered off limits, by
default to everyone. This default position is then lifted (or relaxed) when
specific social circumstances allow for it (e.g., consent, or an acquisition).
84

For some recent work in the area see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of
Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2007); Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of
Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2007); Emily Sherwin, Three Reasons Why Even
Good Property Rights Cause Moral Anxiety, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). For
previous attempts to ground the notion of property in ideals of justice and morality see JEREMY
WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988); J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY & JUSTICE (1996);
David Lametti, The Concept of Property: Relations Through Objects of Social Wealth, 53 U.
TORONTO L.J. 325 (2003).
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HOHFELD, supra note 22, at 96.
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See Lawrence K. Frank, The Concept of Inviolability in Culture, 36 AMER. J. SOCIO. 607 (1931).
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Sociologists and anthropologists have long argued that the idea remains basic
to all cultures, at all times — albeit to differing degrees and extents.87
Anthropologists often associate the idea of inviolability with the notion of
taboo – a socially constructed meaning system where certain acts in relation
to certain things are proscribed.88 Many additionally, consider the idea to be
explained biologically. The two most obvious and prominent areas where
inviolability manifests itself in human behavior are in relation to persons and
things. The inviolability of the person marks a basic tenet of social life, but
isn‘t our main concern here.89 The inviolability of things however remains
equally well entrenched.
In relation to physical objects (as opposed to persons) the norm of
inviolability requires individuals to stay away from things unless they through
some socially accepted practice (e.g., first possession, or consumption) have a
legitimate claim over it. In other words, inviolability requires that unless
object X belongs to A, that A stays away from X. It thus establishes
affirmatively, a default position of staying away from things over which
individuals do not actually or putatively have legitimate claims. Its
importance is as always, best seen through the counter-factual. In the absence
of a norm of inviolability, individuals encountering objects around them
would find little to hold them back from physically (or otherwise)
appropriating the object, as they need and desire. A wouldn‘t stay away from
X unless A knew of and was convinced of B‘s (or someone else‘s) claim over
87

Id. at 614. He notes:
[A] careful, detailed exposition of the concept of inviolability, in its multitudinous
ramifications and implications, will provide at once a basic scheme for the study of
comparative culture, comparative law, and indeed all the social studies and a peculiarly
significant program for investigating the development of personality as it arises in and
through the impact of culture upon the individual.
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For an elaboration of the taboo concept at the interface of law and anthropology see Lawrence
K. Frank, An Institutional Analysis of the Law, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 480, 481 (1924) (―[E]verything
used or useful in living which has been appropriated by someone, or has come from something
appropriated, is taboo to all others.‖). Caution however needs to be exercised in taking this
argument to its logical conclusion. Some have used anthropological studies to conclude that since
taboos connote little more than consequences that attach to certain proscribed activities, they
remain independently meaningless. See Alf Ross, Tû-Tû, 70 HARV. L. REV. 812, 819 (1957)
(noting how the rules of ownership are capable of being expressed without actual use of the word).
Yet, their ability to influence behavior in this way is precisely for our purpose, a recognition of
their normative content.
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See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE‘S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 84 (1993) (offering an investment-based theory as
justification for the inviolability of the person). For an elaborate critique of Dworkin‘s theory see
Richard Stith, On Death and Dworkin: A Critique of his Theory of Inviolability, 56 MD. L. REV.
289 (1997).
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X. The default would therefore point in the other direction: don‘t stay off
unless you are made to. Inviolability thus establishes a norm that where an
individual doesn‘t have a legitimate claim to a resource, someone else is
presumed to, and the former stays away from that resource.
2. Inviolability in Practice
Rules of morality are concerned with the ways in which people lead
their lives and how they treat and interact with each other – often times,
moving from the descriptive (the ―is‖) to the prescriptive (the ―ought‖). 90 In
the process it sets certain ground rules— rules that may of course come to be
modified through legal processes. This is precisely how the norm of
inviolability operates. It sets a default rule of non-interference, subject to
alteration through specific avenues – in both law and morality.
Inviolability, as a moral norm, is inward looking. Rather than relying
on sanction/enforcement for its continued validity, its operation may be
understood in terms of what H.L.A. Hart called the ―internal point of view‖.91
Writing in opposition to the views of consequentialists such as Holmes who
believed that obligations and duties were to be understood exclusively
through the liability structure that they imposed on the holder, Hart argued
that rules —and the duties and obligations that they imposed— come to be
followed because individuals who are subject to them, accept them as ―guides
to conduct‖.92 Acceptance of course doesn‘t necessarily imply a belief in the
moral legitimacy of the rule, just a readiness to view oneself as bound by it.
The reasons could thus be rudimentary convenience, social mores, efficiency,
and the like.93
Propertizing a resource, and vesting someone with ownership over it,
conveys a message of resource-inviolability to the world at large. This
message in turn is understood as placing individuals under an obligation (or
duty) to keep away from the resource, by default, unless some other exception
90

Fried, supra note __, at 2. For a detailed analysis of the ―is-ought‖ distinction that remains
central to moral philosophy see Alan Gewirth, The Is-Ought Problem Resolved, 46 PROCS. &
ADDRESSES OF THE AMER. PHIL. ASSOC‘N 34 (1973).
91
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89 (2d ed. 1994).
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Scott J. Shapiro, What is the Internal Point of View?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157 (2006)
93
Id. at 1161. See also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Obligations and the Internal Aspect of Rules,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1229 (2006); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law
from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563
(2006); Stephen Perry, Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: Liberating the Internal
Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171 (2006).
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necessitates doing otherwise. Inviolability thus serves as a behavioral guide to
individuals, whereby they regulate their conduct in a certain way, to
accommodate it. The right to exclude, is little more than the correlative of the
obligation that inviolability casts on individuals.
The primacy of inviolability as a default norm is more than apparent
in the context of property. James Penner for instance, in his theory of property
structured around the primacy of objects, notes that individuals always
automatically tend to refrain from interfering with objects they see around
them without inquiring to see who the owner of the object is.94 Referring to it
as the ―duty of non-interference‖, he notes that this relation is ―mediated via
the things the owner owns.‖95 Indeed, when we walk down a street lined with
parked cars, we don‘t make it a point to try opening the doors of the parked
cars, even though we almost always don‘t know who the owners are. We
automatically, and by default stay away. The moral norm of inviolability
explains this.96
Allusions to the moral idea of inviolability run through several wellknown historical exegeses of property —most notably those of Grotius and
Pufendorf.97 Grotius argued that interferences with owned resources produced
an injustice analogous to affronts on a person‘s life, limbs and liberty.98 He
thus used the idea of suum (―one‘s own‖) to connect a person‘s self with his
resources.99 This is but a reference to inviolability — and the contiguity of the
idea in the context of bodily integrity and resource-ownership.100 Pufendorf
emphasized that an act of acquisition (―seizure‖) produced a ―moral effect‖
94

PENNER, supra note __, at 128.
Id.
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Merrill and Smith refer to this as the ―dut[y] of abstention‖. Merrill & Smith, supra note __, at
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steal from them, vandalize them, and so forth.‖ Id. at 5.
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For a more detailed analysis of Grotius‘ and Pufendorf see Mossoff, supra note __, at 379-85.
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HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES I.2.i.5, at 53-54 (Francis W. Kelsey trans.,
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which was the ―obligation on the part of others to refrain from a thing‖.101
This is a much more direct reference to the norm of inviolability.
It should be pointed out that the precise strength of the norm tends to
vary across resource and context. If walking across someone‘s front-yard
remains unambiguously objectionable behavior, touching someone‘s parked
bicycle while walking along the street certainly doesn‘t seem as problematic.
Similarly, touching someone‘s handbag may seem less problematic in a
crowded train, but not in an open field. Yet in each case the resource is
clearly owned (by someone else) and forms private property. Much of this
variation tends to depend on social custom. Interestingly enough, it must be
noted out that the law does often factor in this variance in the norm of
inviolability. The variance explains the divergence between realty and
chattels on issues of trespass, the ease with which the law readily presumes an
abandonment of ownership,102 and situations where courts allow other values
to trump the right to exclude.103
The norm of inviolability may have had its origins in rudimentary
convenience – associated with abjectly rival resources. Yet over time, it
seems to have developed into a complex device to coordinate human behavior
across a vast array of resources – often in situations lacking such obvious
convenience. Thus, we still hesitate to set foot on a stranger‘s land in order to
get to the other side of the road, even when doing so is obviously convenient
and of little harm to the owner —representing a clear inefficiency in the short
term. This clearly reflects how well-entrenched the idea of inviolability is.104
3. Inviolability Manifested through the Right to Exclude
If the primary right conception does indeed derive normative value
from the moral notion of inviolability, this raises an important question. Why
101

SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM 547 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather
trans., 1934) (1688).
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is inviolability best reflected in a right rather than a duty (i.e., the right to
exclude)? Since as a norm, it remains directed at individuals and attempts to
modify their behavior, logic seems to dictate that it operate as a duty (of
excluding oneself from certain objects) rather than a right. Why then don‘t we
speak of the ‗duty of exclusion‘ being the most important element of
property? The answer to this derives from the nature of the (right-duty)
correlativity in question and the distinction between relations in rem
(multital) and those in personam (paucital). Multital (or in rem) relations lack
the basic symmetry of their paucital counterparts – and this point becomes
crucial for our understanding of the right to exclude. If A has a claim against
B for money, A has a right against B, and B is under a duty (to repay) owed to
A. Defining this either in terms of A‘s right or B‘s duty makes little difference
normatively.105 When we move to multital relations however, the distinction
between multital rights and multital duties begins to assume relevance. A
multital duty (or in rem duty) represents a situation where an individual is
under a duty (affirmative or negative) owed to an indefinite class of
individuals. The duty of care, central to tort law represents just such a
situation. X driving his car down the road owes a duty (to drive carefully) to
anyone likely to be in the vicinity. Now, for analytical convenience one might
argue that this duty results in anyone actually or potentially in X‘s vicinity
being vested with a ‗right‘ against X. But to define the relationship along
these lines would detract from the intended point of normative emphasis in
the law, which is X and his actions.106 We remain concerned with X‘s actions
(and the harm it causes) and hence understand the relationship in terms of X‘s
duty. This explains why the language of tort law avoids focusing on a ‗right
to be cared for‘ instead of a ‗duty of care‘.
In analogous terms, the right to exclude is a multital right that operates
against an indefinite set of individuals, by placing them under an obligation of
exclusion. Focusing on the duty (of exclusion) instead of the right to exclude
would make sense, along the lines of tort law, if our emphasis were to be on
the consequences of a breach of this duty.107 We speak of a right to exclude,
105

HOHFELD, supra note __, at 73 (noting that the relationship can be viewed from ―different
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rather than a duty precisely because our focus (in so using it) is on the internal
nature of property ownership and on the fact that it associates the right-holder
with the resource. A duty-based conception would make perfect sense, were
the focus of the inquiry entirely on a liability structure and on events
triggering liability.108 By focusing instead on the right and its holder, the idea
serves a coordination function: one of denoting that the holder of the right is
responsible for it in more ways than one. This coordination function in turn,
assumes major relevance for a vast majority of resources that are by their
nature both rival and exclusive. Whereas a duty-analysis wouldn‘t be focused
on the moral basis for the duty (but rather entirely on the legal consequences
of the breach), the ‗right to exclude‘ remains inward-looking and focuses on
its origins and the distinctively social role of the institution of property as a
coordination device.
****
Inviolability thus remains a normative ideal that is best captured by
the ‗right to exclude‘. It remains at once, both forward looking in being
capable of representation as a correlative duty, which when breached gives
rise to liability (i.e., the law of trespass) and yet deeply grounded in the
connection between an individual and an object —central to property‘s role as
a coordination device. Understood then in this sense, the right to exclude
begins to assume significance outside the context of enforcement. One sees
why it is indeed the sine qua non of property, for it remains a manifestation of
the norm of inviolability, on which the entire institution of property is
centered.
4. Simulations and Extensions: Intangibles
As noted earlier, the norm of inviolability tends to operate differently
depending on the resource in question. Resources tend to be defined by two
criteria: rivalrousness and excludability.109 A resource is said to be nonrivalrous when its use by one person doesn‘t interfere with its similar (or
108

In this sense then, associating the ‗right to exclude‘ with an action for trespass remains
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identical) used by another and non-excludable when it doesn‘t admit of being
controlled in a way as to exclude others from using it.110 Tangible resources,
most notably chattels, are both perfectly rival and excludable. Intangibles by
contrast, are both perfectly non-rival and often non-excludable as well. The
subject matter of intellectual property rights —ideas and expression— are
perfectly non-rival and non-excludable (since abandoning the excludability is
a pre-condition for the right being granted).
It is then but logical that as the rivalrousness and excludability of a
resource reduce, so too does the strength of the norm of inviolability that
attaches to it. Consequently, for resources that are both non-rivalrous and
non-excludable the norm of inviolability is practically non-existent.
Informational and intellectual property are thus characterized by low levels of
intrinsic inviolability.
To compensate for this —and to thereby imbue the intangible resource
in question with a genuine property-like character— the law artificially
envelopes the resource in question with the element of inviolability. Thus
when the statute describes a patent as granting its holder the ―right to exclude
others‖ from making, using or selling the protected subject matter, 111 it ought
to be understood as doing little more than stipulating that others are placed
under a correlative duty to exclude themselves from performing those
activities in relation to the identified resource. That it isn‘t a reference to a
remedial consequence is amply substantiated by the fact that the statute
doesn‘t use the phrase in its discussion of remedial options available to a
court, but does so only in its discussion of the grant.112 This is most certainly
then a reference to the primary substantive right and not the secondary.
When we move from patent to copyright, things begin to change.
Unlike patent rights that can be infringed without there being any actual
imitation (i.e., by simply doing one of the acts, the exclusive right to which is
vested in the patent owner), liability in copyright is contingent on a showing
of actual copying, with independent creation being a complete defense.113 It
isn‘t surprising then that the law consciously doesn‘t speak of copyright in
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terms of the ‗right to exclude‘ as it does for patents.114 Inviolability for
expressions, if any, then remains significantly attenuated. Justice Holmes‘
analysis of the right to exclude in the content of copyright best expresses this:
[I]n copyright property has reached a more abstract expression. The right to
exclude is not directed to an object in possession or owned, but is in vacuo,
so to speak. It restrains the spontaneity of men where but for it there would
be nothing of any kind to hinder their doing as they saw fit. It is a
prohibition of conduct remote from the persons or tangibles of the party
115
having the right.

Inviolability in the context of copyright, is largely a fiction.
Understood in this way then, the use of the ‗right to exclude‘ in the
patent statute begins to appear logical and deeply functional. Given that
intellectual property statutes seek to mimic the attributes of tangible property
in more ways than one, the manner in which they do (or don‘t) invoke the
‗right to exclude‘ does in some way signify the extent of their property-ness.
B. The Analogy to Contract‘s Performance Right
As noted earlier, property‘s right to exclude closely resembles the idea
of a contractual performance right. Both remain ideals around which entire
institutions are structured (and understood) and yet, if they were to be
understood entirely through their remedial context, they soon become
divested of their normative significance. Promissory theorists have long used
morality to account for this anomaly.
Of the various primary rights that Hohfeld identified in his discussion,
contractual rights find repeated mention,116 establishing a right-duty
relationship between two or more individuals. In the ordinary bilateral
contract between A and B, where A agrees to do something in return for B
paying him a fixed sum of money, A has a duty to perform his end of the
bargain, the correlative of which is a right to the performance, vested in B. In
similar vein, B has a duty to make payment to A, with A being vested with the
correlative right to obtain such payment.117 The critical point to remember for
114

But see Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1932) (―The owner of the copyright, if
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right to exclude others from using his property.‖).
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White-Smith Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J. concurring).
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See, e.g., HOHFELD, supra note __, at 73, 108, 110.
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Id. at 41-42.
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our purposes is that this analysis of rights and duties is independent of
whether they may actually be enforced as such. In other words, A and B have
these rights and duties, regardless of their enforceability before a court of law,
which would involve secondary rights and claims.118
In exhorting the separation of the primary right from its remedial
counterpart, Hohfeld glossed over a rather fundamental question, and one that
has puzzled legal philosophers and moral theorists for ages. In the absence of
an enforcement mechanism (i.e., secondary right), why would individuals
bother performing their duties? In other words, if the viability of the primary
right is predicated on the existence of a secondary right, then its normative
independence becomes meaningless.119 But if it does remain distinct, why do
we have reason to assume continued adherence to contracts? Thus, in the
example above, Hohfeld would seemingly argue that A‘s duty to B (and viceversa) arises independent of B‘s ability (or A‘s in the converse) to enforce the
same in a court of law. Now, if A knows this ex ante —that is, that his duty to
B is normatively independent of B‘s ability to enforce it, why does A still
adhere to it? The answer seems to lie in the morality of promising.
1. The Contractual Right of Performance as a Moral Right
In the promissory understanding of contracts, contract law is viewed
as a set of legal rules structured around the norms of morality associated with
the institution of promising.120 Under the law, contracts are generally
understood as ―promise[s]… for the breach of which the law gives a remedy,
or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.121‖
Promising thus forms the foundation of contract —or put another way, its
moral counterpart. The promise, in this conception, is a manifestation of
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Id. at 110 (noting how a primary right in personam may be enforced through a proceeding
quasi in rem).
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It of course isn‘t readily apparent that Hohfeld was advocating for its complete independence,
for his analysis seems to be restricted to arguing that the nature and character of the primary right
were to be understood independent of the nature and character of the secondary right that comes
into play to enforce the former. Id. at 102.
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The most prominent promise-based theory of contract law is arguably that of Charles Fried. See
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981). For
other prominent works see Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933);
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract,
89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980).
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individual moral agency, used to give effect to the ideal of trust.122 It is a
moral commitment as to a future act; one that allows the person to whom it is
made (i.e., the promisee) to convert his hope into an expectation. Contract
law then remains nothing more than a set of legal rules directed at giving
effect to the norms surrounding the institution of promising.
The body of literature attempting to so situate contract within the
skein of promising has grown rapidly over the last several decades. To be
sure, it has its skeptics as well – most notably the utilitarians, who use
divergences (most common in the context of remedies) between contract law
and promissory norms to claim instead that contract law reflects little more
than considerations of transactional efficiency.123 Yet the fact remains that the
promissory view of contract law remains one of the most dominant in the
literature.124
In the promissory understanding then, contractual obligations to
perform (a bargain) derive from the moral norms associated with promising.
To speak of a promisee‘s ‗right of performance‘ then is a reference to a
correlative (or primary) right vested in the promisee, consisting entirely of the
promisor‘s duty to perform, a duty that derives not from any recourse to
sanction (for that would entail secondary obligations) but rather from the
institution of promising, on which contract law is premised. The
understanding of the contractual primary right as the correlative of a duty to
perform an obligation tracks the view of contract as a set of mutual promises.
Individuals perform their primary duties to one another, independent of the
remedial consequences of non-performance, because the ideal of adhering to
one‘s commitments derives from norms of morality— norms that influence
behavior and deter certain kinds of actions, independent of legal sanction.125
122

See FRIED, supra note __, at 16 (―The obligation to keep a promise is grounded not in argument
of utility but in respect for individual autonomy and in trust.‖).
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For some of the non-utilitarian criticisms of the promissory theory see DORI KIMEL, FROM
PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT (2003); P.S. ATIYAH,
PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the
Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989).
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See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV.
708, 721 (2007). She notes:
In U.S. law, promises are embedded within contracts and form their basis….The
language of promises, promisees, and promisors saturates contract law – in decisions,
statutes and the Restatement. It also permeates the academic literature through its
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and how.
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incorporation of moral elements into this classificatory structure. Earl in his work, he sought to
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This moral/promissory understanding of the performance right allows
one to make perfect sense of the law‘s reluctance to order performance of a
contractual obligation by default upon a breach. By locating the meaning of
the right in contract law‘s moral sub-structure, it avoids the need to deny the
very existence of any right to actual performance.
2. Enforcing the Promise: The Specific Performance Riddle
While promissory theories of contract law continue to dominate the
landscape, one major anomaly within contract doctrine that continues to cause
them some problem remains the area of contractual remedies.126 Not
surprisingly, it is precisely this area that has also given utilitarian theorists
their strongest argument against the promissory basis of contractual
liability.127
In spite of all else, contract law to this day recognizes monetary relief
(i.e., damages) as the default remedy for breach and specific performance to
be the clear exception, available only in extraordinary cases where monetary
damages are inadequate.128 This remains true of the common law in general,
on both sides of the Atlantic.129 If promising forms the basis of contract law
(and doctrine), then the morality of promising would obviously require
enforcement of the promise as the default remedial measure, upon a breach.130
Yet, specific performance remains the exception --- hinting at the possibility
of the law‘s divergence from morality. The reason for this divergence has
baffled scholars for quite some time now.
make a clear distinction between legal and non-legal conceptions, though he never used the word
‗morality. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
126
See Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies – Efficiency, Equity, and the Second
Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (1981) (setting out the morality-efficiency debate among
contract theorists and noting its reflection in the drafting of the Restatement).
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See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 107 (1986).
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ed., W. Jaeger 1968); E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L.
REV. 1145 (1970). For some empirical arguments that courts nevertheless exhibit greater
inclination to grant specific performance than theory would suggest see M.T. Van Hecke,
Changing Emphasis in Specific Performance, 40 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1961).
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See GARETH JONES & WILLIAM GOODHART, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 2 (1996). See also Andrew
Phang, Specific Performance – Exploring the Roots of ‗Settled Practice‘, 61 MODERN L. REV. 421,
423 (1998) (noting that under English law the grant of specific performance remains the
exception, unlike in civil law jurisdictions).
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313, 320 (2002).
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Utilitarians of course, have made much of this. Most notable is Justice
Holmes‘ famous statement observing that the ―confusion between legal and
moral ideas‖ was manifest in the law of contract and that ―[t]he duty to keep a
contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you
do not keep it, —and nothing else.‖131 This has since been developed into the
―efficient breach‖ theory of contractual remedies, which argues that in
situations where a promisor‘s profits from a potential breach are in excess of
the promisee‘s loss from such breach, the breach should be encouraged (or at
the very least, not deterred) —with no restraints whatsoever imposed by
morality.132 Thus, the promisor is at all times given the option of breaching,
upon the payment of a penalty for the same, in the form of damages.
Contractual promises are thus protected, in this understanding, entirely by
liability rules.133
The utilitarian account views contract as but a sub-species of tort law
– where the law refrains from proscribing certain activities, preferring instead
to interfere at the back-end, in the interests of corrective justice. In similar
vein it argues that contract law does not forbid (or even discourage) a breach,
but prefers to step in and award the injured party damages to make good any
loss. Much of the recent move from the traditions of subjective intention to
objective intention gives added strength to their claims.134 The efficient
breach argument has met with disagreement from both utilitarians— who
argue that specific performance is in general, more efficient than monetary
relief;135 and promissory theorists who attribute it to the vagaries of the
common law process, and as an exception to the general rule. 136 Relying on a
131

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). His next
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Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model
and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977).
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Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. 568 (2006).
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Kantian approach to the role of morality in law, Charles Fried, one of the
most notable promissory theorists argues:
Law can be, should be, but need not be a set of institutions that underwrite,
facilitate, and enforce the demands and aspirations of morality in our
dealings with each other. It is therefore entirely appropriate that various legal
institutions resemble the moral institutions which they partially instantiate.
Contract and promise are like that.137

The attempt to explain this rather major anomaly away as a menial
exception may appear rather simplistic. Yet, the fact remains that in spite of
the non-availability of specific performance as a remedy automatically in
every case, promising continues to form the basis of contracting – both as a
matter of law and practice. Contract doctrine continues to understand itself in
reference to the practice of promising and the moral precepts that underlie
it.138 So it is, as a matter of social practice too —contracts continue to be
made and performed by individuals, most of the time with little regard for the
consequences of the breach.139
Again, the internal point of view and the guidance function of law
provide an explanation for the apparent anomaly. By employing the language
of promising, contract law implicitly exhibits a preference for performance
over breach and the ideal of pacta sunt servanda (―pacts must be
respected‖)140 —a preference that everyday practice deriving from ordinary
social morality emphasizes. The function of contract law and its underlying
norms of promising, being to guide behavior (as much as, or perhaps more
than, to guide judges), the absence of a direct remedial enforcement of the
ideal doesn‘t detract from its centrality to the institution.
137

Charles Fried, The Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 3 (2007)
(emphasis supplied).
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See ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 237 (1922) (characterizing
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NATURE, bk. III, pt. II, § 5, at 519-20 (P.H. Nidditch ed., 2d ed. 1978) (1740) (noting that
promises are human inventions based on the ―necessities and interests of society‖). See also 1
CORBIN, supra note __, at 2 (―[T]he law of contracts attempts the realization of reasonable
expectations that have been induced by the making of a promise… it is believed to be the main
underlying purpose, and it is believed that an understanding of many of the existing rules and a
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(emphasis added). See also Fuller & Perdue, supra note __, at 57 (noting how the law backs the
sense of injury that the ―breach of a promise‖ engenders).
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See Malcolm P. Sharp, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 783 (1941) (describing the
norm as deriving from the practical need for dependability in commercial interactions).
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*****
The analogy to contract law serves to highlight the role that moral norms
and extra-legal ideas can play in structuring legal doctrine. Much like
inviolability, the norm of keeping one‘s promises (i.e., pacta sunt servanda)
forms the foundation on which the rules of contract law are structured —even
if there remain points where its internalization (of the norm) is incomplete.
Rather than clouding doctrine in unintelligible abstraction, these moral norms
remain rooted in social practice and are of great significance to understanding
the operation of the system —be it contract, or property.
C. Toward a Pragmatic Conceptualism of Property
Quite apart from emphasizing the role of non-legal (i.e., moral/social)
norms in property law doctrine, using inviolability as a defining principle
directs attention to something far more important: the role of conceptual
thinking in comprehending the structural and functional attributes of property.
Conceptualism (or formalism) —the attempt to understand and
analyze an institutional practice using its core concepts— has over the
decades come in for harsh criticism from scholars located in the realist or
utilitarian tradition.141 Central to this criticism has been the notion that legal
ideas and institutions always exist in furtherance of some goal, external to the
law and that consequently, a focus on law‘s concepts alone tends to be overly
myopic.142 This view of conceptualism tends to view it as a largely academic
exercise —one with little to no practical influence at all.143
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Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
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Yet, legal concepts can be of significant functional relevance. Most
prominent in establishing this is the work of Jules Coleman, who in analyzing
tort law using a method he terms ―pragmatism‖ and argues that the meanings
of concepts and terms are central and need to be understood in relation to
other concepts and ideas (semantic non-atomism).144 Most importantly
though, he argues that concepts need to be analyzed in terms of the role they
play in actual social practice (inferential role semantics) and that an
institution contains several concepts tied together through a general
principle—that is then at once both an embodiment of the practice (in which
the concepts operate) and an explanation of it (explanation by
embodiment).145
Having set out this general method, Coleman then uses it to analyze
tort law and concludes that all of tort law can be understood through the
principle of ‗corrective justice‘ and that the law‘s core concepts in the area
(i.e, the duty of care, proximate cause, etc.) and actual tort law practice both
reflect the functioning of this principle.146 In the area of contract law, others
have adopted similar functional approaches to analyzing concepts.147
Benjamin Zipursky terms this approach to conceptual analysis
pragmatic conceptualism.148 He further highlights a major advantage inherent
in this strand of conceptualism —it offers a ―way of grasping the domain of
moves that in some sense are built into the concepts of law‖.149 This form of
conceptualism is then perfectly compatible with consequentialist analysis, for
it allows for the possibility that purely consequentialist reasons may have
contributed to the development of the concept, to begin with. It remains
equally compatible with ideas from morality and other extra-legal influences
144
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ground in social practice. It is also directly responsive to Felix Cohen‘s call
for functionalism, except that the functionalism looks to institutionalized
social practice and not merely judicial decisions.150
A pragmatism of this conceptual variety is yet to make its way fully
into property law analysis.151 It is indeed plausible that the fragmentation of
property doctrine has contributed to this. This fragmentation is the result of
different property-constitutive doctrines being classified as elements of either
tort or contract law and analyzed under the guiding principles of those areas
(such as corrective justice or utilitarianism), where they fit most uneasily.152
Identifying a unifying principle in property would go a long way in
remedying this by introducing a minimal level of consistency in all propertyrelated talk.
The previous analysis of inviolability —a functional attribute— and
its connection to the idea of the ‗right to exclude‘, fits perfectly within the
skein of pragmatic conceptualism. The ‗right to exclude‘ remains a
conceptual tool that finds a place in both property practice and doctrine, with
inviolability operating as an explanatory principle. The ‗right to exclude‘,
centered around inviolability, explains not just how courts construct an
owner‘s legal entitlements, but also how individuals understand the institution
of property as constraining their actions and at times imposing affirmative
obligations.
Conceptual analysis of property doctrine along these lines is likely to
be beneficial across a broad spectrum of areas, with it becoming increasingly
common to transplant property ideas and concepts from one context to
another for instrumental purposes.153 Grounding the right to exclude in the
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principle of inviolability and seeking its meaning in the duty it casts on
others, remains a modest first step in that direction.
III. THE REMEDIAL VARIANT: EXCLUSIONARY RELIEF AS A RIGHT
As noted earlier, it remains unsurprisingly common in modern times,
to equate the right to exclude with an entitlement to exclusionary (or
injunctive) relief. This approach is largely functional and developed from the
realist idea that it is meaningless to speak of a right, in the absence of a
remedy capable of enforcing it.154 Pragmatic as it may seem, it tends to gloss
over numerous subtleties inherent in the idea of the exclusionary remedy.
Almost all of these subtleties derive from the fact that injunctive relief is an
equitable remedy. Since its inception, equitable relief has been considered
subject to an independent set of doctrinal constraints, all of which result in it
being characterized as an ―extraordinary remedy‖ by courts. Talk of a right to
exclusionary relief tends to ignore the unique role of equity in this conception
of the right. What does it really mean then, to speak of a right to an
exclusionary remedy?
Indeed, it was precisely this question that the Supreme Court took it
upon itself to answer in eBay. This Part focuses on the equitable remedy
conception of the right to exclude, examining the interface between equity
and the rights discourse in the context of real and intangible property and then
attempts to use the analysis to understand the eBay holding and its aftermath.
Section III.A begins with an overview of the remedial conception of
the right: the right to injunctive (exclusionary) relief and concludes that the
reference to a right here is little more than an expectation of a specific
outcome, given the nature of the subject matter involved —i.e., property
rights. The conversion of a routine-grant into a grant as of right was largely a
rhetorical device. III.B then analyzes eBay and the Court's rejection of the
routine-grant version of the right to injunctive relief.
The Court in eBay certainly wasn't presented with the inviolabilitybased (i.e., claim-right) conception of the right to exclude. Yet, its holding
alludes to the possibility that this is indeed what the right has meant all along.
Critics who fault the holding tend to ignore altogether the conceptualist
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As Karl Llewellyn, well-known realist scholar noted, ―[A] right is best measured by effects in
life. Absence of remedy is absence of right. Defect of remedy is defect of right.‖ KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 83-84 (1960).

Demystifying the Right to Exclude

42

construction of the right and the possibility of the Court implicitly endorsing
it.
A. The Traditional Test and the Right to an Injunction
An injunction is best defined as ―an order of the courts directing a
party to the proceeding to do or refrain from doing a specific act.‖ 155 As a
form of relief, the injunction is a preventive rather than restorative remedy;156
and being equitable in nature, the injunction remains rooted in the distinction
between equity and common law —in spite of its popularity. As is well
known, equity developed to alleviate the rigidity of the common law and in
recognition of the inadequacy of common law remedies to offer the plaintiff
satisfactory relief.157 Consequently, establishing the inadequacy of ordinary
common law remedies became a necessary precondition to the grant of
equitable relief. To this day, the ‗rule of inadequacy‘ continues to remain an
integral part of equitable doctrine, though its contours have varied over
time.158 In an indirect way however, the rule of inadequacy worked to
establish an implicit hierarchy in remedial forms: courts (and plaintiffs) were
mandated to look to ordinary (i.e., common law) remedies at first instance,
and only when they were able to establish that such remedies were either of
little use or had been exhausted, would courts proceed to consider the grant of
an equitable remedy.159 To even consider the option of injunctive relief,
courts thus had to be convinced of the inadequacy of the default (i.e.,
ordinary) remedy —compensatory damages.
The rule of inadequacy eventually gave rise to a requirement of
irreparability.160 Under this formulation, plaintiffs now had to establish that
ordinary remedies were inadequate because the harm (to be prevented) was
irreparable through ordinary compensation. Termed the irreparable injury
rule, it is today associated with an inability (arising out of whatever reason) to

155

R. MEGARRY & P. BARKER, SNELL‘S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 624 (27TH ED., 1973).
156
WILLIAM WILLIAMSON KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS 1 (5th
ed., John Melvin Paterson ed. 1914).
157
See JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 33 (1836).
158
See Developments in the Law —Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 999-1000 (1965).
159
See OWEN FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 1 (1978).
160
See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.1 (1973). For more on the inadequacy
rule see Doug Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an Injunction, 33 U.
FLA. L. REV. 346 (1981); Developments, supra note 93, at 1002.

Demystifying the Right to Exclude

43

quantify the damage sought to be prevented.161 While scholars often use the
inadequacy and irreparability rules as synonyms, some formulations tend to
list them as independent factors that need to be satisfied, though it isn‘t clear
that the content needed to satisfy each of them differs significantly at all.162
While the rules of inadequacy and irreparability require the plaintiff to
establish a
need for exclusionary relief, they never factored into
consideration directly the interests of anyone else —most notably, the
defendant. In due course therefore courts developed the doctrine of ‗relative
hardship‘ or ‗balancing of the equities‘. In simple terms, this rule prevents a
court from granting a plaintiff injunctive (i.e., equitable) relief, when ―the
cost to the defendant of obeying the injunction is substantially greater than
the objective benefit to the plaintiff‖ from the same.163 The rule thus forces
courts to examine the individual circumstances of the parties before it, prior
to granting relief.164 Once these three rules are satisfied courts are then
required to ensure that the grant of the injunction would not run contrary to
the public interest. The public interest requirement is a catch-all category that
enables courts to factor in considerations that might ordinarily have been
deemed extraneous to the dispute between the parties— such as whether the
issuance of the injunction would impose costs on society as a whole, or
whether it would defeat the purposes of the law.165
Together, these four rules —inadequacy, irreparability, relative
hardship, and public interest considerations— constitute the traditional ―fourfactor‖ test for the grant of an injunction, which courts are obligated to apply.
161
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As is apparent, the test (in its components and as a whole) gives courts a
significant amount of discretion in applying it to individual cases. 166 Indeed,
the element of discretion (driven by the need for flexibility) has long been
considered the defining feature of equity a whole.167 Quite apart from these
injunction-specific rules, the rules of equity grant courts broad authority to
factor in a host of other considerations in deciding whether to grant relief or
not —referred to generically as ‗equitable considerations‘. Doctrines such as
‗clean hands‘, in pari delicto, or laches have long formed the basic building
blocks of courts‘ equitable jurisdiction.168 Given then that the grant of relief is
discretionary, the crucial question for us is whether it becomes credible to
speak of a right to injunctive relief.
In spite of their adherence to these four rules in other contexts, in
relation to property rights however, courts have tended to exhibit a general
predisposition towards granting injunctive relief. Deriving from the maxim
that ―equity protects property rights, not personal rights‖, courts began
recognizing that they were ―bound to protect‖ property rights and focused
their attention on whether a right in question could be legitimately classified
as proprietary or not.169 In focusing on this classificatory question (albeit with
significant inconsistencies in their final determinations), they operated on the
assumption that legal (i.e., common law) remedies were inadequate to protect
property rights and that injunctive relief was therefore often a fait accompli. It
wasn‘t until much later that courts moved away from the property/personal
distinction as the main focus of their inquiry.170
Equity‘s historical preference for property over personal rights is itself
the subject of some controversy. Some attribute it to a misinterpretation of
historical precedent,171 while others argue that it arose as a consequence of
equity‘s use of property rights to establish its jurisdiction in situations where
it otherwise wouldn‘t have had any.172 Yet almost everyone characterized the
distinction as being artificial and often resulting in an abjectly unjust denial of
166
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relief.173 Soon enough, the distinction was done away with —but equity‘s
connection to property has ever since been considered somewhat special.
Even after the property/personal distinction became diluted, the
argument that property rights necessitated injunctive relief continued to
remain —and derived from the obvious inadequacy of damages as a
preventive/deterrent mechanism. Central to this was the notion that if
damages were to be the only (or even primary) form of relief, it would in a
majority of cases allow one private individual to take the resource of another
without the latter‘s consent, a form of private taking.174
Whereas the grant of equitable relief (of any kind) had long been
considered a matter ―of grace‖, by the nineteenth century, courts had begun to
expressly repudiate this rule and replace it instead with a rule that injunctions
would issue ―of right‖ whenever property rights were in issue. 175 What this
meant was merely that the discretion to grant was being replaced with a
discretion to deny —with the onus now being on courts to justify their
decisions refusing relief rather than granting it. Invariably, this derived from
the ‗balancing of equities‘ part of the test.176 When property rights were
involved, courts deemed the irreparability and inadequacy components
satisfied and implicit in this move was the belief that property‘s element of
exclusion could only ever be protected through injunctive relief. This became
most apparent in the contexts of real property trespasses and patent
infringement —and is dominant even today.
1. Real Property: Injunctions Restraining Acts of Trespass
Historically, courts exhibited a reluctance to grant injunctions
preventing trespasses unless an element of waste was involved. 177 In due
course however the waste/trespass distinction (in the context of injunctive
173
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relief) came to be repudiated and courts came to recognize that injunctions
would issue ―in aid of the legal [i.e., property] right‖.178 The focus thus
shifted to making sure that the right asserted was in fact legitimate —i.e., that
the person claiming title (or ownership) did in fact have title over the land in
question.179 Equity also developed a rule distinguishing between naked and
destructive trespasses, based on the imminence of irreparable damage to the
land in question.180 In due course however the irreparable damage element
became linked to the vitality of the plaintiff‘s legal right. Thus, courts came to
recognize that trespassory interferences could be legitimately restrained even
when the damage wasn‘t necessarily significant physically or monetarily: a
possible allusion to the normative damage such interferences were likely to
result in (captured by the injury/damage distinction or the rule of iniuria sine
damno —―legal injury without actual damage‖181). Kerr thus notes that ―[a]n
act of trespass, not in itself amounting to serious damage, may from its
continuance, amount in the opinion of the Court to trespass attended by
irreparable damage‖ and that situations could exist ―where great damage may
be done to property, though the actual damage done by the trespass is
nothing.182‖
In relation to trespasses therefore, courts began to focus on assuring
themselves of the plaintiff‘s legal right, and a breach of (or interference with)
the same, whereupon they proceeded to ―interfere at once‖ and grant a
perpetual injunction.183 By contrast, where either the right or a breach of the
same, remained doubtful, courts were reluctant to interfere and proceeded
instead to engage in a balancing of the equities. Where both (i) the right and
(ii) its breach were proven, the issuance of an injunction became in a sense,
mechanical, as long as the issuance of injunctive relief wasn‘t meaningless —
178
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i.e., where the act complained of had ended, such as where the trespass was
isolated. In such situations, the court‘s discretion came to be limited severely
(to exceptional circumstances meriting a denial), and the law came to
recognize the plaintiff as being entitled to the relief sought. The discretion to
grant became transformed into a discretion to deny in exceptional situations.
As Kerr notes:
After the establishment of his legal right and the fact of its violation, a man
is entitled as of course to a perpetual injunction to restrain the recurrence of
the wrong, unless there be something special in the circumstance of the
case.184

Following from this, once the a priori right to exclude and an
interference with it are established, it therefore seems legitimate to speak of a
injunctions issuing ‗as of right‘.185 While scholars have tended to equate
rights with entitlements ‗as of right‘ in other contexts,186 it bears emphasizing
that the right here always remained discretionary. Courts never abdicated
their discretion, but merely came to limit it to exceptional circumstances.
Perhaps the most well-recognized ‗exceptional circumstance‘ where courts to
this day routinely deny injunctive relief remains that of good faith improvers
184
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(i.e., situation of innocent encroachments).187 In situations where the owner of
an adjacent property mistakenly builds a structure on his neighbor‘s, courts
usually prefer damages to having him destroy the structure, in recognition of
the burden and waste the destruction is likely to result in.188 As is to be
expected, this exception is limited to mistaken improvements and is of no
application to intentional (or ‗bad faith‘) encroachments.189
All of this is in contrast with the rule that was at issue in eBay —
where the ‗exceptional circumstances‘ limitation had become redundant, with
the right being in a sense absolute and courts devoid of any discretion to
deny.
2. Injunctions Restraining Patent Infringement
Intangible rights such as patents and copyright remain different from
other forms of property in more respects than one. Yet here too, we see the
idea of exclusion forming the core around which the proprietary significance
of the rights revolves. The law relating to patent injunctions remains rather
well-developed and was directly at issue in eBay. It therefore remains
apposite to examine this area.
A patent grants its holder, a set of exclusive rights in relation to a new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement of the same.190 More importantly though, a
patent‘s functionality is understood in terms of the ‗right to exclude‘. Once
granted, a patent gives its holder the ―right to exclude others‖ from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention in question.191
In most claims for patent infringement, two issues are almost always
in play —the validity of the patent grant, and the fact of infringement. The
former involves determining whether the administrative agency issuing the
187
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patent adhered to the conditions for the grant (i.e., novelty, utility and nonobviousness), and the latter entails proving that the defendant performed one
or more of the activities that the patent holder is granted an entitlement to
perform exclusively. Once both validity and infringement are established, the
court then proceeds to the issue of remedies and here injunctive relief remains
the most popular remedy.
Courts initially applied the irreparability and inadequacy criteria with
significant regularity. In due course however emerged the realization that in
situations where an infringement did in fact exist (and was continuing),
denying the holder an injunction was tantamount to rendering the patent‘s
grant of exclusivity meaningless.192 Irreparability and inadequacy thus came
be presumed as a matter of course, each time a valid patent was proven to
have been infringed. Even though the traditional test remained in place, in
practice when ―the right [was] well established and the violation clear, neither
considerations of public or private convenience, or hardship to the defendant,
[prevented] the court from interfering.193‖ Once validity and infringement are
established, the norm became that a court ―may interfere at once and grant an
injunction‖.194 All of this arose from the rather obvious inadequacy of
damages to prevent further acts of infringement.
Equity thus came to treat intellectual property closely analogous to
real property. Once title (validity) and trespass (infringement) were
established, the grant of injunctive relief seemed to follow naturally. Here too
though, courts never openly eliminated their discretion, except to admit to
exclusionary relief becoming the default option. The frequency with which
this occurred created an expectation among plaintiffs (i.e., patent holders) that
injunctive relief would always follow (once validity and infringement were
no longer in issue), notwithstanding the traditional test and the vestige of
courts‘ discretion.
*********
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Over time, courts of equity thus began to limit their remedial
discretion by presuming elements of the traditional (four-factor) test to be
satisfied whenever a valid property right was in issue and it was shown to
have been interfered with. What was initially a discretion to grant was
transformed into a discretion to deny. Yet, the discretion always remained –
however minimal it may have been. The right to injunctive relief (as a variant
of the owner's right to exclude) is then, at best, a strongly conditional right.
Property holders came to legitimately expect that when their valid interest
was interfered with, courts would, with few exceptions, find the issuance of
an injunction unproblematic.
It ought to be emphasized however that even in situations where they
readily came to limit their discretion and recognize that injunctive relief was
the necessary, natural or proper remedy, courts do not seem to have ever
considered themselves legally bound to actually grant the injunction.
Now if this is indeed all that the right to exclude entailed —a
discretion-laden entitlement to injunctive relief— one might be justified in
characterizing property law's emphasis on it to be misplaced. Yet in eBay the
Court was confronted with a significantly stronger version of the rule, one
that effectively eliminated all remedial discretion.
B. De-linking Right and Remedy: Understanding eBay
It remains possible however to envisage an even stronger variant of
the rule favoring the grant of injunctive relief for property violations. This
would involve eliminating any possible discretion —to deny the injunction—
that a court might have, and making the grant completely automatic, once title
and interference are established. This approach would then involve
abandoning altogether the idea of discretionary remedialism that once formed
the central feature of equitable remedies.
Discretionary remedialism is the view that courts have the discretion
to award plaintiffs an ‗appropriate remedy‘ in the circumstances of individual
cases and aren‘t necessarily limited to specific kinds of remedies within any
category.195 To be sure, it comes in different forms and flavors, but the idea of
discretion is central to it.196 Critics of discretionary remedialism focus on the
195

Simon Evans, Defending Discretionary Remedialism, 23 SYDNEY L. REV. 463, 463 (2001).
See Darryn M. Jensen, The Rights and Wrongs of Discretionary Remedialism, 2003 SING. J.
LEGAL STUD. 178; Patricia Loughlan, No Right to the Remedy?: An Analysis of Judicial Discretion
in the Imposition of Equitable Remedies, 17 MELB. U. L. REV. 132 (1989); David Wright, Wrong
and Remedy: A Sticky Relationship, 2001 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 300; Paul Finn, Equitable
196

Demystifying the Right to Exclude

51

fact that it becomes problematic to speak of rights (in the remedial sense), if
discretion of any kind remains an element of the remedial discourse. They in
turn prefer a strict rule-based approach to the discretionary one.197
It was precisely this conflict between a discretionary approach and a
rule-based one that the Court encountered in the context of the automatic
injunction rule in eBay. Since its inception, the Federal Circuit had developed
a rule in the context of patent injunctions, under which courts were bound to
grant plaintiffs a permanent injunction, once validity and infringement were
factually proven.198 As a direct consequence, the right to exclude —statutorily
delineated as the central element in a patent grant— came to be equated with
a plaintiff‘s automatic entitlement to injunctive relief in infringement actions.
In eBay, the Court unanimously rejected the Federal Circuit‘s rule.
1. The Automatic Injunction Rule
A few years after its establishment in 1982, the Federal Circuit
formulated a general rule that in suits for patent infringement, a permanent
injunction would automatically issue upon a finding that the patent was
infringed and that it was not invalid.199 While in formulating its rule, the court
had retained an ―exceptional circumstances‖ limitation —perhaps in
recognition of the ‗discretion to deny‘ formulation; yet in practice it had
interpreted the limitation as being of application only when public health or
safety were in issue.200 Given its general reluctance to invoke the ‗exceptional
circumstances‘ rule, the issuance of injunctions came to be recognized as
mechanical, once infringement and validity were proven.201 In so doing, it
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had also explicitly refused to apply the traditional four-factor test in its
traditional formulation. Its rationale was, in simple terms, the pre-eminence of
the right to exclude within the set of rights granted to the patentee. In one of
its early cases, it noted that without an injunction, the patentee‘s right to
exclude would be diminished, the owner would lack leverage and the patent
would have only a fraction of the value it was intended to have. 202 In this
understanding then, a refusal to grant an injunction in situations where
validity and infringement had been affirmatively established without
question, would amount to a denial of the basic right to exclude.203
Interestingly though, in laying down the rule, the Federal Circuit had
adopted a rather counter-intuitive interpretation of the patent statute, which
provides that ―courts having jurisdiction of [patent] cases… may grant
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation
of any right secured by patent‖.204 The automatic rule, mandating the grant
seemingly disregarded the unequivocally discretionary language used by
Congress. It isn‘t at all surprising then that in 2005, a legislative effort was
mounted unsuccessfully to remedy this anomaly— by requiring courts to
apply the four-factor test in patent cases.205The automatic rule thus
concretized the connection between property and injunctive relief, through
the right to exclude.
Now while the Supreme Court, prior to eBay, never directly
considered the automatic rule, nearly a century ago, it did expound on the
philosophy behind injunctive relief in patent cases. In so doing, it seemed to
both endorse the rule and attribute its primacy to a patent‘s conferral of the
right to exclude. In Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.,206
the defendant questioned the court‘s authority to issue an injunction when the
patent hadn‘t been put to use – even when validity and infringement had been
affirmatively established. While the Court didn‘t rule on the automatic
injunction rule, it went on to observe:
202
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From the character of the right of the patentee we may judge of his remedies.
It hardly needs to be pointed out that the right can only retain its attribute of
exclusiveness by a prevention of its violation. Anything but prevention takes
away the privilege which the law confers upon the patentee. …. Whether,
however…in view of the public interest, a court of equity might be justified
in withholding relief by injunction, we do not decide.207

The Court‘s use of ―right‖ and ―prevention‖ make it clear that it is
indeed a reference to the right to exclude. The privilege that the Court refers
to is, is the privilege of exclusive use —part of the patent grant (and one that
is shielded by the right to exclude). What is also clear from the Court‘s
analysis is the implicit recognition that the discretion if any, is only a
discretion to deny and not one to actually grant and that an injunction remains
the default remedy, when the right to exclude (i.e., property) is involved.208 It
is the existence of this discretion (to deny) that the Court seems unsure of —
thereby implicitly endorsing the automatic rule, in the context of patent
infringements.
2. The Supreme Court and the Automatic Injunction
In eBay, the plaintiff MercExchange brought an action against the
defendant, alleging infringement of its business method patent. The defendant
had sought to license the patent from the plaintiff, but negotiations eventually
broke down, ultimately resulting in the plaintiff bringing the action in Federal
District Court in Virginia.209 At trial, the jury found the patent in suit to be
valid and that the defendant had indeed infringed it. The District Court
however denied the plaintiff‘s motion for a permanent injunction to restrain
the defendant‘s infringement, instead awarding it damages. Applying the
four-factor test to the facts before it, it concluded that damages provided the
plaintiff with an adequate remedy and would best serve the public interest.210
Much of the District Court‘s concern seems to have stemmed for three
elements: one, that the patent in question was a business-method patent, the
growing issuance of which had made the PTO introduce an additional level of
207
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review prior to issuance;211 two, that the plaintiff wasn‘t actually using (i.e.,
working) the patent, but was merely seeking to license it; and three, that the
plaintiff had sought to license it to the defendant and made public its intent to
merely seek damages.212
On appeal, the Federal Circuit characterized the District Court‘s
concerns as unpersuasive.213 Restating the general rule that ―courts will issue
permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional
circumstances‖, it reversed the District Court.214 In so doing, it went on to
note that injunctions weren‘t reserved for inventors who intended to practice
their inventions and that ―the right to exclude is equally available to both
groups, and the right to an adequate remedy to enforce that right should be
equally available to both as well‖.215 The Supreme Court then agreed to
review the matter.216
During oral argument, Justice Scalia seemed most defensive of the
Federal Circuit‘s approach. When the petitioner sought to argue that equity
had systematically rejected the idea that relief might ensue categorically in
particular circumstances, Justice Scalia retorted that this wasn‘t the case with
the use of someone else‘s property, noting that ―we‘re talking about a
property right here…the right to exclude others….[t]hat‘s what the patent
right is. And all he‘s asking for is give me my property back. 217‖ Later, in
response to the government‘s intervention, Justice Scalia re-emphasized the
inconsistency between characterizing the right as a property right and
providing only for damages, noting that this conveyed the message ―[h]ere,
take your money, and you… go continue to violate the patent‖.218
Yet, when it eventually handed down its decision, the Court‘s opinion
side-stepped almost completely, the property issue.219 In three separate
opinions (one for the court and two concurrences), the Court reversed the
Federal Circuit.220 Without deciding on the facts of the case before it, the
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majority opinion merely reiterated that the grant (or refusal) of injunctive
relief was a matter of equitable discretion, and one that had to be ―exercised
consistent with traditional principles of equity.221‖ In other words, the Court
basically reaffirmed the centrality of the four-factor test. Chief Justice
Roberts‘ short two-paragraph concurrence does little more. While noting the
difficulty inherent in ―protecting a right to exclude through monetary
remedies‖, it nevertheless concludes that this ―does not entitle a patentee to a
permanent injunction or justify a general rule that such injunctions should
arise.‖222 This categorical language seemingly eliminates both variants of the
automatic injunction rule, discussed above—the weaker variant (converting
the discretion to grant into a mere discretion to deny) and the stronger one
(eliminating all discretion). Surprisingly however, the opinion goes on to
draw a distinction between an exercise of equitable discretion and writing on
a clean slate, observing that such discretion may indeed be limited by legal
standards in order to ensure consistency.223 This observation is presumably
intended at setting out the practical consequences of the Court‘s elimination
of the automatic rule: that even though the discretion does exist, in order to
ensure consistency, it may be applied according to well-established standards
that result in consistent outcomes.
Justice Kennedy‘s concurring opinion too adds very little, except to
note that historical practice may provide courts with some guidance on the
exercise of their discretion. It attempts to identify the problems inherent in the
automatic injunction rule – noting that an injunction would grant companies
merely interested in obtaining licensing fees, undue leverage – which may be
detrimental to the public interest.224
The Court was thus seemingly motivated by the need to curb the
practice of companies that made their revenues by simply licensing out
inventions, without actually working them – often referred to as ‗patent
trolls‘. The petitioner made much of this during oral argument and the Court
seems to have been motivated by this concern, as Justice Kennedy‘s opinion
makes amply clear.225
Whether legitimate or not however, the concern with patent trolls
ought to have been the subject of Congressional intervention. The statute in
its current form specifically recognizes the possibility of such trolling and
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expressly disables courts from denying a party relief upon a refusal to license
or use the patent in question.226 In taking the matter into its own hands, the
Courts opinion seemingly contradicts the express language of the statute.
Property rights always introduce the problem of holdouts into the picture and
when this remains a genuine concern, legislative intervention alleviates the
problem.227
Perhaps more importantly though, the Court‘s opinion is hard to
reconcile with its decision in Continental Paper Bag, discussed earlier. It is
probably for this reason that the opinions make no reference at all to that case,
even though the Court suo moto requested to be briefed on the matter and in
fact did hear oral argument on the same. The one isolated reference to the
case, uses it to make the point that the District Court‘s position – denying the
patentee an injunction categorically, because of its attempt to license the
invention – was impermissible.228 The Court thus implicitly affirmed its prior
position in Continental Paper Bag, even though its express holding remains
irreconcilable with it.
3. The End of Automatic Injunctions: Intellectual Property and Beyond
If there is one point that the Court‘s excessively narrow holding does
affirmatively establish, it is that the automatic injunction rule for patents no
longer exists. In its zeal to invalidate the stronger version of the rule however,
it eliminated with it the weaker version as well. The big question is whether
its holding applies beyond the realm of intellectual property, to tangible
property as well.229
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The Court‘s ruling now requires courts to apply the traditional fourfactor test, even after the issues of validity and infringement have been found
for the plaintiff-patentee. Part of the test requires the patentee to establish that
―remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate‖ for the injury.230
The test is thus founded on the idea that ordinarily damages— or
compensatory remedies— are the default option, and exclusionary remedies,
i.e., injunctive relief are to be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances.
The weaker version of the automatic injunction rule would have merely
altered the default, by in some sense shifting the burden onto the defendantinfringer to prove that injunctive relief was inappropriate in light of the
circumstances. The holding effectively reintroduces the ancient remedial
hierarchy that equity practice had come to dilute significantly over the course
of the last century or so, specifically in relation to property rights.
Most importantly though, the Court‘s holding is not restricted to the
domain of patent or indeed intellectual property law and would seemingly
apply to automatic injunctions in the context of tangible property as well. The
logic of the Court‘s rejection of the rule was the need to treat injunctive relief
in the context of patents on equal terms with injunctive relief in other
contexts. Indeed, its observation that the traditional factors ―apply with equal
force‖ to patent disputes, is aptly indicative of the same.231 Additionally, and
perhaps of more relevance, is the fact that in support of its holding (that
patent injunctions needed to follow the traditional test) the Court relied on
two cases, neither of which had any connection whatsoever with patents or
intellectual property, but nonetheless did involve automatic injunctions.232
Consequently, there remains good reason to believe that the Court‘s holding
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applies to the entire gamut of automatic injunctions, not just those related to
patents.
In this reading of eBay then, the automatic injunction rule —in both
variants— and in connection with both intellectual and tangible property,
stands abrogated. In its place, the traditional four-factor test and with it, the
preference for damages (to all other remedies) remains the norm.
4. Moving to Efficient Infringement (and Trespass?)
If the absence of a direct recourse to specific performance in the
context of contract law serves as doctrinal evidence of a theory of efficient
breach, does the eBay holding now signal a move towards a normative theory
of efficient trespass/infringement in the context of property rights?
The four-factor test, with its emphasis on inadequacy and
irreparability has long been analyzed, as involving little more than a costbenefit analysis.233 In situations where it is inefficient to coerce performance
of the contract, courts award damages. If this is precisely what the four-factor
test entails, then mandating a rigid adherence to it in the context of property
implies a similar emphasis on efficiency.
To be sure, the idea of ‗efficient trespass‘ or ‗efficient conversion‘ has
been in existence for long, with some using it as a logical extrapolation of the
efficient breach theory to illustrate the incompatibility of the theory with the
idea of property.234 This approach however tracks the remedial emphasis on
the right to exclude —for as we have seen, the centrality of the right to
exclude doesn‘t derive from its actual enforcement. Others have raised the
idea of ‗efficient trespass‘ in the context of other property doctrines (such as
adverse possession),235 but have stayed clear of offering a normative account
of the theory —given the general structure of equity practice prior to eBay.236
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Even if one doubts that the Court‘s holding does have implications
outside of intellectual property, within that context at least, it certainly signals
a move towards a doctrine of efficient trespass of intangibles —or efficient
infringement.237 In situations where the infringement of a patent (or other
intellectual property) right appears to have short- and possibly long-term
efficiency gains (especially in the social welfare sense), courts are now not
just allowed but actually mandated to avoid granting exclusionary relief. This
is borne out most distinctively in the Court‘s concern with patent trolls —
entities that hold the right without actually using it directly. Even though the
statute explicitly recognizes the possibility of such activity, and additionally
requires courts to avoid factoring it into their decision on remedies,238 the
Court thought it appropriate to incorporate the matter into its standard
analysis. Factoring in trolling is undoubtedly an efficiency/utilitarian
calculation —with the belief being that the public is somehow benefited by
the actual working of a patent (even if by an infringer), rather than its nonworking— one that Congress thought best to avoid in its attempt to structure
patents as property rights.
The move from trolling in the intangible world, to other obvious
utility-enhancing activities in the context of realty and chattels, isn‘t really
that far. Take the case of an absentee landowner and a squatter (assuming of
course, that the period of limitation for adverse possession hasn‘t passed), or
that of a landowner who seeks to prevent someone (or the public) from
crossing his land for reasons that cannot be justified on economic terms. 239 In
each of these cases, the four-factor test would presumably militate against the
grant of injunctive relief. Now, in some areas of property doctrine, equity
already recognizes just such an efficiency calculation in its grant of relief —
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the most obvious being that of unintentional building encroachments. 240 Its
direct incorporation however into the four-factor test makes it (i.e., the
efficiency trade-off) applicable across the board to all property disputes.
eBay thus signals a clear move towards efficiency concerns
influencing the grant of injunctive relief in cases involving property and
intellectual property rights. The previous presumption that property rights
were intrinsically efficiency enhancing, which therefore obviated the need for
a secondary efficiency calculation at the time of their enforcement, no longer
holds true.
************
Regardless of whether eBay‘s formulation of equity‘s test for
injunctions is consistent with the historical trend in the area, the Court‘s
holding does conclusively establish that the remedial conception of the right
to exclude is not what property entails. Ironically then, at the same time that
the Court‘s holding moves the law in the direction of a utilitarian approach to
injunctive relief, it also rejects an exclusively consequentialist understanding
of the right to exclude. To be sure, the Court certainly didn‘t hint at what an
alternative conception of the right might be —and perhaps for good reason.
Central to the ambivalence surrounding eBay is the fact that patents
remain (by both structure and intent) a form of private property built around
the ‗right to exclude‘. Yet, if this didn‘t entail exclusion by injunctive relief, it
seemed futile, at first blush, to continue emphasizing the centrality of
exclusion. The inward-looking conception of the right to exclude —deriving
from inviolability— provides a complete answer to this apparent disconnect.
Viewed in this light, the Court in eBay then might have implicitly
acknowledged the simple, yet often-overlooked, reality that property (and
with it the right to exclude) is a meaningful institution, independent of its
judicial enforcement.
CONCLUSION
Taken at one time as being axiomatic of what the idea of property
meant, the idea of the right to exclude has in more recent times receded into
the background. While the anti-formalism that has characterized the modern
property discourse has undoubtedly contributed to this,241 so too has the
240
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insufficient attention that courts and scholars have paid to disaggregating the
idea and its meaning. Consequently, it has indeed become increasingly
common to characterize the idea as a ―trope‖ or rhetorical epithet, devoid of
functional relevance.242
While the Court‘s holding in eBay may be interpreted by some as
contributing to this move —by rejecting the most dominant conception of the
idea— I have sought to argue that in so doing, the holding in fact directs
attention to what the ‗right to exclude‘ has meant all along. Understanding the
institution of property to be grounded in the norms associated with the
principle of inviolability casts the right as nothing more than the correlative
of the ‗duty to keep away‘ from a resource over which the norm applies. This
in turn focuses attention on the role of property (and ownership) as a
coordination device for scarce and rival resources. Counter-intuitively then,
the Court‘s holding strengthens the normative significance of the idea.
The holding in eBay closed the door on but one conception of the
right— the remedial version. The automatic injunction rule that the Court
rejected there, had resulted in the right to exclude coming to be understood as
the right to exclusionary relief. Yet, just as the absence of a ‗right to specific
enforcement‘ isn‘t considered indicative of the very notion of a contractual
right to performance being altogether non-existent, so too does the absence of
a right to exclusionary relief have little bearing on the centrality of exclusion
to property. The primary right conception of exclusion, much like the primary
right conception of contractual performance, derives its normative content
from an underlying moral ideal, on which the institution of property bases
itself: inviolability. Inviolability represents a principle central to peaceful,
coordinated social existence and the ‗right to exclude‘, as a correlative to the
duties that derive from it, converts it into a legal (as opposed to moral) norm.
The ‗right to exclude‘ then remains the defining ideal of property. If
the idea of property is understood outside of its remedial (or enforcement)
context, and instead as a social institution that coordinates access to and use
of scarce resources, the primary/correlative right conception begins to make
logical sense. Recasting the right to exclude along these lines, it is hoped, will
contribute towards moving property debates away from their singular
emphasis on remedialism and towards a broader analytical framework for the
institution.
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